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ABSTRACT
An abstract of the thesis of Christopher Ward Shelley for the Master of Arts in
History presented March 15,2002
Title: The Resurrection of a River: The Umatilla and its Salmon.
Until the 1990s, salmon had been extinct from the Umatilla River for over
70 years. The struggle to bring salmon back to this river is a compelling story that
exemplifies some of the new relationships in Columbia River Basin salmon
management.
The Umatilla River and the disappearance of its salmon was a local issue.
Irrigation interests had used the river so thoroughly it ceased to flow during the
late summer and fall months-precisely when salmon needed it for migration. The
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation saw decided that they
would change that: they would figure out a way to put both salmon and water back
into the river.
This thesis examines this process. First, it contextualizes the Umatilla
River within the Columbia River Basin and Columbia Basin salmon management,
and shows how a local salmon issue became a regional salmon issue. It then
discusses the triangle of relationships that Indians, salmon, and hatcheries have
come to form. Chapter III discusses the formation of the unique Umatilla Fish
Restoration Program, which reintroduced fish into the river, and was paid for by
the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), as per the Northwest Power Act. Key
elements within BPA's Fish and Wildlife Division resisted complying with the
directives of the Northwest Power Planning Council to pay for the Program,
setting the Program back years. I argue that this comes from two clashing ways of
seeing the River: "cost-benefit analysis" versus "least cost."
Chapter IV looks at the new partnerships formed in the Umatilla River
Basin by the Tribes and irrigation districts in order to encourage the U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation to construct a water delivery system that would satisfy irrigators
while allowing most of the Umatilla to flow freely.
The last Chapter suggests that these new and somewhat ironic partnerships
between federal and state governments, private irrigators and landowners, non-
governmental organizations, and Indian tribes are key to restoring ecosystems in
the Columbia River Basin. It further argues that without tribal nations playing an
active role and exerting their treaty rights, restoring rivers like the Umatilla is
impossible.
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CHAPTER I-INTRODUCTION: THE SPIRITUALDEATH OFA RiVER
The bleaching of algae once waving green underwater to white; river
stones once cool now hot to the touch and dry; spider webs stretched
where there had been salmon eggs; snakes where there had been trout-it
was as though the river had been abandoned.
-Barry Lopez'
INTHENORTHEASTOFOREGON,rivers flow radially from two great
mountain ranges, the Blues and the Wallowas, which rise up out of the semi -arid
Columbia Plateau. Like crooked spokes, five salmon-bearing streams, the Imnaha,
the Grande Ronde, the Tucannon, the Walla Walla, and the Umatilla, wind out of the
mountains into the great counter-clockwise half-wheel of the Snake and the
Columbia Rivers. The western of these ranges, the Blue Mountains, shed water north
and west into many small creeks that flow through dry foothills or wheat -covered
plains and gather into the Umatilla River. Through the heart ofthe Umatilla Indian
Reservation, then through the City of Pendleton, and bending north, the Umatilla
enters the Columbia River just downstream from McNary Dam.
Or at least, the Umatilla enters the Columbia when it contains water. During
the late summer and early fall months the Umatilla is sucked dry along its last three
miles by the relentless thirst of irrigated farms. By the 1920s, the practice of
irrigation on the Umatilla River and its major tributaries diverted enough water for a
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long enough period at crucial times during the year to exterminate the native chinook
and coho runs that had migrated to the river for eons.'
Salmon and steelhead represent a spiritual, cultural, and economic resource
for the Cayuse, Walla Walla, and Umatilla Indians, the three tribes that comprise the
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation (CTUIR).J The historic
reliance of Mid-Columbia River Indians on salmon is well documented." In the
Treaties of 1855 they ceded title to millions of square miles ofland and reserved the
right to fish at "all the usual and accustomed stations.t" Numerous court decisions
since the tum of the century have consistently affirmed this reserved right, but over
the last half of this century, many of the accustomed fishing places along with the
fish have disappeared, thus eroding the Indians' rights." By 1974, when Judge
George Boldt in United States v, Washington recognized the rights of all signatory
tribes to the 1855 treaties with Washington Territorial Governor Isaac 1. Stevens by
guaranteeing them one-half the catch of all available salmon, their right to fish had,
in fact, already been severely restricted by developments on the Columbia River and
its tributary basins." Irrigation diversions that began to water farms at the tum of the
century dried up rivers on the plateau and killed fish. Federal irrigation projects on
the Columbia's tributaries such as the Yakima and Umatilla from 1905 into the
1920s killed fish more efficiently and prevented them from reaching traditional
fishing grounds on and near the reservations. Dam building on the Columbia River
mainstem from the 1930s into the 1950s had obliterated many traditional fisheries,
including Celilo Falls. While the government compensated the Tribes monetarily for
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some of these losses, the radical alterations to the Columbia River Basin
environment shattered the cultural center of a people.i
By the 1970s, the Confederated Tribes had resolved that it would no longer
live with a dead Umatilla River. Because of legal developments, changes in public
opinion, and the shifting of alliances among wildlife management agencies in the
Columbia River Basin, the Tribes saw a window of opportunity to bring about
change. In 1980, capitalizing on a growing concern in the region over declining
salmon numbers, the Boldt decision, and the passage of the Northwest Power Act,
the Tribes advanced a plan to revive the Umatil1a as a viable salmon stream.
The purpose here is to document the restoration of salmon to the Umatil1a
River, a medium-sized stream in Eastern Oregon. The story of the Umatilla River
salmon is deceptively simple-a river's salmon were extirpated, then years later
were restored. Yet it cannot be told without understanding the complex connections
between the Columbia and Umatil1a Rivers. Neither can the story of Columbia River
salmon be separated from the history of Columbia River Indians, who have relied on
salmon for hundreds of generations and were the major actors in resurrecting the
spirit of their river. And the restoration of these remarkable fish cannot be told
without examining the political and managerial power structure that administers
salmon restoration in the Columbia River Basin.
To extract the meaning of this restoration out of the complex nature of the
Northwest salmon crisis, we must grapple with three major issues. First is the three-
sided relationship of Columbia River Indians, Columbia River salmon, and salmon
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hatcheries. The relationship ofIndians to salmon is ancient. It is at once spiritual and
economic and legal, and it ties the Indians inexorably to the rivers of the Columbia
Basin. The relationship of hatcheries to salmon is much younger, just over one
hundred years old. Historically, fish managers used hatcheries on a massive scale,
without hard scientific data to understand their effects. More recently scientists have
shown that the abuse of hatcheries has done great damage to wild salmon
populations. "Salmon culture" (as the artificial propagation of salmon was called
early in the century) is no longer the be-all and end-all of anadromous fish
management. 9 This has led to a vigorous debate about the place of hatcheries, if any,
in salmon recovery. Similarly, the newer relationship ofIndians to hatcheries has
been quite controversial. To help bring back salmon, the signatory tribes of the 1855
treaties in the Columbia Basin have employed the idea of using small-scale
hatcheries to augment wild fish. The Tribes' use of hatcheries has upset some
environmental groups that advocate strictly for wild fish. It has also upset state fish
and wildlife organizations that have had a monopoly on hatchery production for
decades. The failure of modem fishery managers to include Indians in discussions
about hatcheries and the unwillingness of the states to consult with the Tribes on
hatchery policies, contrary to the implications of the Boldt decision, has caused the
Indians to perceive the actions of governmental agencies as a betrayal of their treaty
rights. JO
The second issue is the "nuts and bolts" of salmon recovery in the Umatilla
Basin. The Umatilla Program was just one of an array of projects aimed at reversing
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the decline of salmon and steelhead in the Columbia Basin. The process of planning,
funding, and constructing the hatchery system to restore salmon to the Umatilla
illustrates many of the problems of basin-wide salmon recovery. Here, the
fundamental problem is the conflict between the "new" way of running the Columbia
River system represented by the statutory power of the Northwest Power Planning
Council and its focus on biological imperatives, and the "old" way of running the
river exemplified by the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bonneville Power
Administration. This "old" way of running the river is based on economics over
ecology, and it is founded on the classic paradigm of river development that has
prevailed on the Columbia since the Second World War: the cost-benefit analysis. I I
Cost-benefit analysis is a legitimate tool for judging the comparative worth of
projects that develop infrastructure and whether they are economically justified.
Using this model, a municipality might estimate the value of a bridge by judging the
cost of building that bridge against the economic benefits that the society can
reasonably expect from the bridge's construction. But cost-benefit analysis produces
a truncated understanding of projects with biological goals. The Northwest Power
Act charges the Northwest Power Planning Council (NPPC) and the bureaucracies
that run the hydroelectric operations with restoring salmon by the most cost effective
means possible. Restoration is an imperative, not an option. But the "old" way of
managing the Columbia Basin dies hard. It has proved difficult for engineers and
bureaucrats to overcome the older imperatives of economic and engineering
efficiencies. Cost-benefit analysis has become so ingrained in the language of river
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managers that, despite the biological requirements of salmon and steelhead in the
basin, it is still difficult for the agencies in charge of the river and salmon restoration
b d i 12to move eyon It.
Third, restoration could not have happened without a fundamental change to
the Umatilla itself. The parched river needed sufficient water. To this end, the Tribes
cultivated support from local groups in the Umatilla Basin to lobby Congress for a
$46 million water exchange project, one that would swap Columbia River water to
the irrigators for Umatilla River water. This statutory appropriation of funds was
successful and applauded locally, but regionally it had to overcome stiff resistance.
River interests from outside the Umatilla Basin, such as utilities that were direct
customers of BPA, fought all aspects of the fisheries restoration program and the
Umatilla Basin Project. As electricity ratepayers, and therefore indirectly paying for
Bonneville's fish and wildlife expenditures, these utilities argued against restoring
both salmon and water to the Umatilla River. Nevertheless, in 1988, partially
because of the influence of Oregon's senior senator, Mark Hatfiled, Congress passed
the Umatilla Basin Act to re-water the Umatilla.
Because of the intractability of water politics in eastern Oregon, the tactics of
the Tribes to bring water back to the Umatilla did not involve litigation and an
assertion of water rights (as they did with the fisheries program by asserting fishing
rights). Therefore, the Umatilla Basin Project changed none of the traditional
relationships of irrigation and federal water policies. While many argue there must
be a fundamental shift in the management of electricity generation and irrigation
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water disbursement in the Columbia Basin toward ecological harmony and balance,
this project would not address that. No governmental agencies, state or federal,
would radically alter the way water was distributed in the Umatilla Basin. These
agencies, irrigation districts, and Indian Tribes could avoid the controversy of
reallocating the Umatilla River if tens of millions of dollars from outside the region
could reallocate part of the Columbia. Rather than revolutionize the way water is
allocated in arid eastern Oregon, the Project relied on the tried-and-true method of
developing the American West: the appropriation of funds from the federal
government.
Before we examine salmon restoration on the Umatilla River, this chapter
shall set the backdrop by looking at three other topics that are critical to
understanding this narrative. First is the nature of the Umatilla River and the reasons
for salmon decline in the Umatilla Basin. Second are the physical and political
effects of the mainstem dams. Third is the creation of the Northwest Power Planning
Council's Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program.
Drying the Umatilla
The Umatilla's headwaters in the Blue Mountains appear pristine, the
quintessential mountain stream: a perfect habitat for anadromous fish and the
spawning ground of the few wild steelhead still in the basin. The North and South
Forks flow through old-growth forest and converge just east of the Umatilla Indian
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Reservation. The river runs down into the foothills, collecting the side creeks
flowing from canyons. Ponderosa pine and Douglas fir stand on the steep grades of
the canyon walls. On the cobbled riverbed, where cottonwoods and willows line each
bank, there are occasionally downed trees bolted to the river-bottom by thick cables:
the product of stream restoration efforts. Cattle graze in the riverbottom upstream
and in the side canyons of these hills, and the green and brown algae along the river
bottom are a result of their manure. White, dried pond scum bakes along the stones
where the riverbed is exposed. Already, miles upstream of the major irrigation
diversions the river is somewhat degraded.
Downstream, the steep foothills diminish. The river's canyon gradually
becomes a valley. The mixed evergreens thin to a few pines. The scent changes from
pungent coniferous forest to that of ripening wheat fields after a thunderstorm.
Rolling hills of golden-brown grasslands, with no trees at all, then almost no hills,
then merely a depression, a shallow fold in the land where the only green is the
cottonwood belt of the river. The Umatilla's valley becomes a slight dip where it
flows in broad turns through lands more flat, into the wheat fields.
The river leaves the Reservation and after a few miles it enters downtown
Pendleton, flowing just north of the center of town, where the river begins to sicken.
Under a bridge, more clots of green algae cling to rocks and trail behind them like
green beards. Brown algae blooms in profusion along the bottom where the current is
slack. The river gradually slices through to the southwest of town, and runs down,
under the Interstate, along crumbling basalt bluffs and through farmer's fields. It is in
8
these last 35 or so miles between Pendleton and the Columbia that irrigation takes its
great toll. A small diversion dam shunts water into a ditch away from the river. The
ditch goes under the road, then along the road, then above the road. In a barely
descending traverse of the hillside, flowing downhill far less rapidly than the river or
the road, the ditch twists and curves, following the contour of the hill off into the
sagebrush, to some faraway wheat or alfalfa field. Below the road is a short
diversion, maybe Echo Dam or Maxwell Dam, shiny with the newly built facility for
passing salmon upstream, or collecting them for truck transport if there is no stream
to pass up into. Judging the entire river by looking at this reach, from the town of
Echo to the city of Umatilla, the Umatilla would hardly be one's first choice to
reestablish salmon.
The river continues to degrade the nearer it gets to the Columbia. Three miles
from the confluence with the Columbia is the largest diversion, Threemile Dam. It is
a slightly curved concrete structure approximately seventy-five yards long and rising
twenty feet above the level of the dying river. Its downstream face is sculpted into
scalloped concavities, where water seeps through small cracks. In the perpetual
shade of a northern exposure mosses and slimy algae grow. The old, decrepit fish
ladder on the west bank has been augmented by a brand new ladder and holding
facility built into the dam on the east bank. A pond at the foot of the ladder holds a
dozen enormous carp, demonstrating that this is a warm-water habitat, not the cold-
water home of salmon. A trickle finds its way out of the pond, down a parched basalt
bed, across the foot of the dam, then downstream. What is left of the Umatilla is
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maybe six inches deep. Despite the shiny newness of the fish ladder, it is clear from
this tiny trickle of water on a glaring mid-July afternoon (not even the "dry season"
of August) that the river dies before it reaches the Columbia. Decades of over-
appropriation, withdrawing more water than the river's ecosystem could sustain,
have crippled the lower reaches of the Umatilla.
To the early settlers of eastern Oregon, the huge, dry plains of the Columbia
Plateau were meant to be grazed and farmed. But in the American West farmland is
seldom any good without access to flowing water. To simplify the complex Plateau
sage-and-juniper ecosystem into a monoculture and convert the land into wealth,
farmers began to draw on the rivers of region to water their crops. This was a huge
undertaking. Itwas not simply a matter of cutting a ditch or two into the river and
using the water. Most of the converted plains lay far from any stream. Itwould take a
great feat of engineering to collect and distribute the water needed to "make the
desert bloom."
During the first half of this century, great feats of engineering were the order
of the day for the United States Bureau of Reclamation. By 1905, the Bureau was
already involved in huge water projects across the West, and this was yet another
opportunity for it to "improve" nature's work. I)Why, after all, had nature put the
most powerful river in the world within spitting distance of these farmers, yet leave
them in near-desert conditions? Boosters advocating an expansion of agriculture on
the plateau saw the great potential of big dams along the Columbia and Snake Rivers
for irrigation. But from 1905 until the mid-1930s, the Bureau of Reclamation took on
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the less ambitious but still impressive challenge of manipulating not the Columbia,
but tributaries like the Yakima and the Umatilla. 14
In 1905, the Bureau began several reclamation projects in the Umatilla River
Basin. The Bureau constructed reservoirs at Cold Springs east of the town of
Umatilla, and McKay (pronounced MUHKYE)south of Pendleton. 15 The Bureau also
built a series of diversion dams and irrigation ditches on the Umatilla's mainstem
that snaked away from the river, traversing hillsides and winding away to farms
outside the immediate river valley. As these projects began to water crops all over
the basin, they began to have an impact on anadromous fish. The earthen dams
created lakes that impounded important tributaries to the Umatilla, which reduced
the instream flow and cut-off miles of stream habitat. The irrigation ditches had no
screens to keep young fish from flowing into the fields with the water. The
diversions diverted large quantities of water, impeded fish passage, and raised water
temperatures to levels lethal to salmonids.
The river quickly began to dry up. More and more farmers acquired water
rights from the state and more and more ditches slurped the precious fluid away from
the river. By 1910, after most of the Bureau's projects had altered the river, boosters
were calling for still more water. Sensing that the Umatilla's water would soon be
spread too thin, the irrigators and promoters of economic development of the area
called for a big dam on the Columbia at the Umatilla Rapids, where the pooled water
could be spread over many more acres. Already irrigators could see that their
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expanding fanning economy, putting more and more acres under cultivation, was in
danger of over-appropriation.' 6
By the 1920s the Bureau of Reclamation and local irrigators put most of
eastern Oregon's rivers to work. The Umatilla ceased to run year-round to the
Columbia River. This suited irrigators, since the prevailing wisdom held that it was a
waste for any unused water to escape to the Columbia. But this annual man-made
drought coincided with the run of summer and fall chinook to the river. Migrating
adults had to face what amounted to a seasonal annihilation of their habitat just at the
time they needed it most. In July, August, and September, the lower Umatilla River
became either a slow-moving mire of farm wastes, or totally nonexistent.!' The
Umatilla winter steelhead were spared total destruction because their fortuitous
migration brought them to the river in December, long after demand for irrigation
water had subsided for the year, and after the winter rains allowed them the water
they needed to make it to the headwaters where they spawn. By 1914, chinook and
coho were virtually extinct from the Umatilla]8
The death of the Umatilla was not an isolated incident: the Umatilla was just
one of many river basins in the Columbia Plateau and in the Blue and Wallowa
Mountains, like the Walla Walla, the Grande Ronde, the Wallowa, and the Imnaha,
that had its fish exterminated or severely stressed by irrigation. This local extinction
of salmon was just a single instance of a larger environmental degradation. This was
a sub-basin-by-sub-basin phenomena.
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After the First World War, the ambitions of boosters reached for more than
the tributaries of the Columbia could provide, and the re-making of the waters of the
Columbia Basin shifted from the tributaries to the mainstem of the Columbia and
Snake.19 What had been local development, like the pursuit of irrigators on the
Umatilla and Yakima rivers, or like the generation of hydroelectric power by private
utilities on the Clackamas or Sandy rivers, was no longer enough. Men like Rufus
Wood envisioned an "agricultural-industrial empire" based on irrigating the
Columbia Plateau.2o This transformation of the focus of development from the local
to the regional came about because of the economic imperative of Franklin
Roosevelt's New Deal. Roosevelt employed economic initiatives that were national
but applied according to the needs of each region. In the I930s in the Pacific
Northwest, New Deal recovery was based in part on the largest scale alteration the
Columbia Basin had yet seen: the construction of the big dams.
lOt
The Northwest Power Act
The impact of the mainstem dams is the other element crucial to
understanding salmon restoration in the Umatilla Basin. The development of
irrigation that dried the Umatilla and killed off salmon was a local effect. The federal
development of the dams from 1938 to 1975 marked the change from local to
regional effect on populations of anadromous fish. They created a series of blockages
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that hampered salmon and steelhead passing up and downstream. The dams acted as
a sort of thrombus, clotting the artery of the river to the nutrients represented by
salmon. They subjected each local salmon population east of the Cascades, no matter
where it was ultimately bound, to pass through these clots that killed many fish.
They regionalized salmon destruction.
The idea of developing the mainstem Columbia and Snake Rivers was
originally a local proposition. "Boosters" from places like Wenachee, Washington or
Umatilla, Oregon pushed the federal government hard for a dam on their reach of the
river that would provide boom times for their local economies. Local needs in these
communities differed from one another and required different projects. For example,
in the 1920s people in Wenatchee wanted Grand Coulee Dam in order to create a
huge irrigation project. Similarly, as early as 1918, farmers in Umatilla wanted
access to more irrigation water too, but primarily wanted the Umatilla Rapids Dam
(later called McNary) to help facilitate barge traffic by drowning several rapids on
the Columbia and permitting crops to get to the markets in Portland and the rest of
the world cheaply." To get this "open river," locals envisioned a series of dams and
locks that would create the "Northwest Passage" of which entrepreneurs and
explorers had always dreamed.f
With the entry of the federal government (the only entity in the 1930s with
the capital to complete such massive projects), these projects spun out oflocal
control. Despite their boosters' wishes, the dams would not be controlled locally, but
were to become part of a regional system. The Army Corps of Engineers, which was
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initially against "multipurpose" dams, had surveyed the Columbia and Snake Rivers
in 1927 for possible dam sites. The "308" reports projected an entire chain of dams
strung like pearls on the mainstems of the Columbia and SnakeD These would
generate cheap hydroelectricity, provide flood control, produce more subsidized
irrigation, and secure an open river. Beginning with the construction of Bonneville in
1938 and extending to Lower Granite in 1975, this string of dams made Lewiston,
Idaho a seaport by transforming the Columbia and Snake from free-flowing rivers to
a vast industrial machine."
This machine also accelerated the decline of salmon in the mid- and upper-
Columbia Basin, a decline begun by irrigation and over-fishing. The first two federal
dams, Bonneville and Grand Coulee (completed in 1938 and 1941, respectively),
were watched carefully by fish biologists to ascertain their effects on the salmon.
The construction of Grand Coulee was a disaster for salmon, although there was an
abortive attempt to save upper-Columbia fish with a series of hatcheries. The dam
annihilated the famed "June hogs" bound for spawning grounds in Canada."
Biologists also watched Bonneville Dam anxiously, since this dam could potentially
destroy all anadromous fish runs east of the Cascades. They breathed a sigh of relief
when the fish began to use its huge ladders and passed upstream. But while
Bonneville did cause fish some problems, this single dam in 1938 did not create an
insuperable problem for salmon. It was the Corps' construction of an entire
succession of dams over thirty years that was so devastating.
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This devastation is because the effects of the big dams have been cumulative.
At each dam between 5% and 14% of salmon that attempt to pass are killed, both
out-migrating to sea and in-migrating to spawn. While salmon bound for the
Klickitat, Deschutes, or John Day rivers may suffer only moderate losses (with at
most three dams to pass), it is easy to see the effects of this attrition on a Snake River
population of sockeye, chinook, or coho, which must face as many as eight ofthese
behemoths. These losses have crippled the ability of the upriver runs to sustain their
numbers?6
The damage inflicted to salmon runs by dams is multifarious. It is perhaps
worst for juvenile fish. The slow-moving slack waters behind the dams force smolts
to run an already deadly gauntlet without the benefit of rushing water. Smolts face
being shredded in dam turbines, cooked in too-warm water, eaten by predators who
take advantage of slow moving smolts, and suffer lesions and exploding eyeballs
from nitrogen supersaturation in a fall over the dam spillway.
Biologists recognized, at least superficially, the regional effects mainstem
dams would have on salmon runs before Grand Coulee was completed. Congress
attempted to legislate relief. The first major attempt was the Mitchell Act in 1938.
The Mitchell Act established funds for a series of federal fish hatcheries that would
offset, or "mitigate," the losses caused by the darns." But in the 1970s, as salmon
numbers continued to dwindle to precariously low numbers, and as more was
understood about just how the dams were killing fish and how hatcheries contributed
to the decline of native stocks, Congress again went to work.
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In 1980, Congress developed a mechanism to guide anadromous fish policy
in the Columbia River Basin: the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and
Conservation Act.28 This Act established the Pacific Northwest Electric Power and
Conservation Planning Council, a regional entity composed of two gubernatorial
appointees from each of the major Columbia River Basin states: Oregon,
Washington, Idaho, and Montana.i" The objective of the Northwest Power Planning
Council is to reverse the decline of salmon populations and begin recovery by
balancing the needs of the fish with the generation of hydroelectric power and other
water uses. Part of the act's purpose is
to adequately protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife, including
related spawning grounds and habitat, affected by such projects or
facilities in a manner that provides equitable treatment for such fish and
wildlife with the other ~urposes for which such system and facilities are
managed and operated. 0
This Council was charged by Congress to develop a comprehensive plan that would
mitigate against and reverse the
decline of salmon and steelhead runs in the Columbia River Basin east of the
Cascades, the area effected by the big dams. With the words "equitable treatment,"
the Northwest Power Act did what no official policy had done before: it officially
made salmon and hydroelectric power "co-equal."
This purpose makes the Northwest Power Act a groundbreaking piece of
legislation. The language of the Act shows that the intent of Congress was for the
agencies in charge of running the river--the Bonneville Power Administration, the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation--to operate the
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river giving both anadromous fish and hydropower an even level of consideration."
To coordinate the balance of salmon conservation and hydropower needs, Congress
instructed the Council to use the best information gathered from the biologists who
were the real experts in the field: those of the state fish and wildlife departments,
federal agencies like the National Marine Fisheries Service, and the Columbia River
Intertribal Fish Commission. The Act specifically forbade the Council to establish
itself as a "super fish and wildlife agency.?"
As historian William L. Lang has pointed out, the forces that developed the
river, BPA and the Army Corps of Engineers, sacrificed anadromous fish at every
point as an acceptable cost to the perceived benefits of the dams, chiefly of cheap
hydroelectricity." The Northwest Power Act promised to change that. No longer,
according to the Act, could the needs of anadromous fish be ignored when operating
the river; salmon must be given equal consideration. This equitable treatment, or
"parity" as law professor Michael Blumm calls it, is crucial to interpreting the
Northwest Power Act.34 To provide this parity, the Act lowered the "burden of
proof' of scientific findings from absolute proof to "the best scientific knowledge
available." By stating that biologists should proceed with "the best available
scientific knowledge available," the Act made it clear that fisheries experts no longer
needed absolute proof of how salmon might be helped or hindered by a given
project. 35 The intention of the Northwest Power Act was that harm or help to salmon
and steelhead runs no longer had to be proved completely by biologists in order to
carry administrative weight. Fish and wildlife experts were not required to study an
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issue to death in order to cancel a harmful project, alter a harmful operating
procedure, or proceed with a restoration project.
Because Congress recognized specifically the dams' impact on the region's
anadromous fish, the Act mandated that the agency in charge of marketing
hydropower produced from those dams should pay for all salmon mitigation efforts
endorsed by the Council. 36 This meant an essential change in the way the Bonneville
Power Administration operated. Since its creation BPA had been required to market
the hydropower from the dams and pay back the federal treasury what the dams cost.
The Northwest Power Act changed BPA's traditional mission from just marketing
power to marketing power while paying for what has become the most expensive
wildlife conservation plan in American history."
The Umatilla River and the Northwest Salmon Crisis
In 1982 the Northwest Power Planning Council published the Columbia
River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program. The program formulated a plan to revitalize
salmon and steelhead runs that would comprise the entire Columbia River Basin east
of the Cascades.
During in the late I970s, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian
Reservation had developed a modest plan to boost the numbers of steelhead in the
Umatilla River. After the passage of the Northwest Power Act, the Tribes
approached the Council with a more ambitious plan to reintroduce chinook and coho
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salmon. The Council quickly recognized that the Umatilla had several inherent
advantages for fish restoration. Because the Umatilla empties into the Columbia just
downstream of McNary Dam, any Umatilla fish population need only pass three big
mainstem dams: Bonneville, The Dalles, and John Day. The Council saw that a
rehabilitated Umatilla Basin would be a large territory for producing fish, and
contribute to its stated goal of doubling fish runs." It thereby included plans for the
Umatilla in the 1982 Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program.
In 1984, the Council backed-off stating actual goals for anadromous fish
recovery. The Tribes and the fish and wildlife agencies wanted fish numbers up to
their pre-McNary Dam levels.'" The Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference
Committee (PNUCC), an umbrella organization that represented the Direct Service
Industries (which included aluminum manufacturers), consumer-owned utilities, and
investor-owned utilities that were dependent on wholesale rates from BPA, objected,
claiming that the pre-McNary numbers of fish were too high.4o The Council steered a
middle course, and decided to postpone articulating any goals until after a study by
BPA that would evaluate "past, present and potential production. ,,41 The Council's
reaction to PNUCC, a consortium tied fundamentally to the river's hydropower,
setting aside the recommendations of biologists, show that politics and not biology
were already influencing decision-making. But irrespective ofthe Council's
ambivalence toward specific goals, it supported two specific ideas for rebuilding
salmon runs in the Yakima and Umatilla basins.
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The NPPC was not mandated by Congress to deal specifically with Indian
fishing rights, although it was required to consult the Tribes. Nevertheless, the
Council understood that meeting the Umatilla Tribes' goals would help meet its own.
The Fish and Wildlife Program was "designed throughout to restore fish runs by
improving fishery habitat so that Indian tribes will be able to realize the rights
secured by their treaties.,,42 The goal of doubling the number of salmon in the
Columbia River Basin, honoring treaty obligations, combined with geography to
make the Umatilla one of the Council's highest priority fish restoration projects.
The act charged the Council to produce a program that would reverse the
damage to salmon runs by the dams.
The Council shall promptly develop and adopt. .. a program to protect,
mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife, including related spawning grounds
and habitat, on the Columbia River and its tributaries. Because of the unique
history, problems, and opportunities presented by the development and
operation of hydroelectric facilities on the Columbia River and its tributaries,
the program, to the greatest extent possible, shall be designed to deal with
that river and its tributaries as a system."
To deal with the Columbia as a system would require the Council to take a broader
approach than past mitigation efforts had undertaken. The charge to approach the
tributaries as a part of the Columbia opened the door for the Umatilla program.
Previously, projects that had been designed to mitigate the effects of dams
were located physically near the dams. For example, many Mitchell Act hatcheries
were placed right along the river or on tributaries very close to Bonneville Dam, such
as Carson Hatchery or the Wind River Hatchery. Others, like John Day Dam, had
dual Oregon-side/Washington-side hatcheries as part of their original design. It was a
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simple zero-sum game: as a dam destroyed salmon, its neighbor hatchery would
replace those salmon. Thus there was a direct spatial relationship of dam to hatchery,
between damage and mitigation.
However, the Council saw beyond this cause and effect relationship of
damage-to-mitigation. To truly double the numbers ofretuming salmon the Council
redefined the idea of mitigation in more ambitious terms. It did so by expanding the
space where mitigation projects could be implemented. In an effort to decentralize
hatchery production, which biologists understood was in itself unhealthy to wild fish
stocks, and which the Tribes recognized as crucial to getting salmon back into
tributaries, the Council decided that mitigation projects should take place in the sub-
basins where historically strong populations of salmon once spawned. In effect, the
Council said that injury to anadromous fish by the dams could be mitigated by
projects "off-site." The Council radically altered the definition of mitigation by
including such projects that were far from the source of the damage."
The Council's new interpretation of mitigation created a relationship that had
not previously existed between the big mainstem dams and the Umatilla Basin. The
big dams had nothing to do with the demise of Umatilla salmon: Umatilla salmon
were extinct at least ten years before the first dams came on-line. Even though the
damage to the Umatilla salmon populations was not hydropower related, the NPPC
saw restoration of Umatilla salmon as exactly the new kind of mitigation it was
proposing. Also, by adopting the Tribes' proposed program in the Umatilla Basin, it
would be furthering its own goals while conforming to its mandate of remaining
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sensitive to the tribal perspective. This interpretation would arise later as a legal
issue as opponents to BPA expenditures began to line up against the program.
Nonetheless, the NPPC saw the Umatilla Basin as an ideal place for a mitigation
project, a unique opportunity.
Because the Council decided to use the Umatilla Basin as a mitigation
project, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation suddenly gained
financial support of the Bonneville Power Administration for its restoration program.
With this new source of funding, the Umatilla, Walla Walla, and Cayuse Tribes, with
the help ofthe Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, revised a steelhead hatchery
plan that the two had drafted in the late 1970s. This new plan was exponentially
more ambitious: it called for a system of hatcheries that would reintroduce naturally
spawning chinook to the Umatilla Basin. This idea itself was a radical departure
from the traditional concept of hatcheries, which were little more than fish factories
producing meat for "harvest." The Council saw the Umatilla Basin as a functional
nursery for the production of thousands of salmon. The Tribes envisioned a Umatilla
River resurrected from seventy years of spiritual death.
THEDEMISEOFTHEGREATSALMONRUNShas created a profound sense
of distress among Pacific Northwesterners. The perception is that an animal that has
become an indispensable icon of the region is disappearing." This sense of "crisis,"
dubbed the Northwest salmon crisis, is an issue far too vast to tackle in this, or any
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single, essay." But by looking at the recovery of a medium-sized river in the heart of
the Columbia Basin we can glimpse what it might take to revive the numbers of
anadromous fish in the rest of the Basin, and the extraordinary problems such revival
will face.
During the 1990s, the Northwest salmon crisis became the most complex
natural resource issue in the nation. The range of Columbia River salmon is
immense, with many stocks of salmon and steelhead listed under the Endangered
Species Act as either threatened or endangered. These listings, coupled with the
treaty rights of the Columbia River Indians and the statutory authority of the
Northwest Power Act, means that there are complex legal issues at play.
Scientists know far less about anadromous fish than they would like. If they
do not fully understand the salmon's life in fresh water, they know next to nothing
about its pelagic life. The combination of genetics, run timing, and homing instinct,
among others, renders much biology as best guesses.
The fact is that almost anything that humans do to the land hurts anadromous
fish. Farmers with uncovered heaps of manure in the Willamette valley; residents
washing their cars in their driveways in Portland; ranchers with cattle wading in
streams on their property on the John Day River; farmers opening valves on
irrigation ditches near Echo on the Umatilla River; loggers clear-cutting a section of
forest in the headwaters of the Clackamas River; the longshoreman at the grain
elevator in Arlington on the Columbia; the excavation of a foundation for a hillside
home on the White Salmon River; the writer sitting at his desk turning on the electric
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lights of his home on Mt. Hood; all these things hurt salmon. And all these things are
tied to the way Northwesterners make a living. These people are political
constituencies with congressmen who have similar sensibilities.
Cultural values of both Indian and non-Indian passionately cry out for
recognition. Environmentalists have raised the awareness of other Euro-Americans
in the region, and helped all to see salmon as part of our "natural heritage" instead of
merely a commodity. Native peoples have a much older and sophisticated
relationship of sustenance, prosperity, and spirituality with Columbia River salmon
than non-Indians. Because of the Treaties of 1855, Indians possess the legal right
have salmon in the rivers. It is a bewildering combination oflegal, cultural,
economic, political, and biological considerations that make a student of the salmon
crisis throw up his hands in the face of these seemingly intractable conflicts.
But are they intractable? Here we shall examine a success story. The
historical importance of the Umatilla River as an expression of the Northwest salmon
crisis is three-fold. First, it represents the way river systems in eastern Oregon had
their salmon and steelhead decimated, if not totally wiped out. The Umatilla River
Basin exemplifies the kind of habitat loss typical of the Plateau. Second, the Umatilla
experience exposes how bureaucracies can resist making the necessary changes for
the sake of salmon restoration. Third, and perhaps most important, the Umatilla story
demonstrates the importance and determination of tribal people to be a vital force in
salmon recovery.
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At the core of this story is a river that lay dead for decades. The Native
Americans who relied on that river wished to change that, to resurrect the river. The
Tribes, using complex legal and financial mechanisms, coupled with increased
political strength, began to execute an involved plan to revive the river. But the
mechanism for funding the plan threatened to break down; the politics of Columbia
River system management was far too entrenched in the old way of running the river
to allow the plan to proceed unimpeded. The Umatilla River Fisheries Restoration
Program was stalled for five years because of institutional inertia and stubborn,
intractable personalities.
This first chapter has laid out the major background issues: the death of the
Umatilla, the legislative framework of recovery, and the place of the Umatilla in a
greater atmosphere of crisis. Chapter II further contextualizes the Umatilla program
by exploring the foundations of the relationships between Indians, salmon, and
hatcheries to give meaning to how powerful is the idea of restoring the Umatilla.
Chapter III examines what this program is, how it came to be, and what it meant to
certain bureaucrats at the Bonneville Power Administration who could not
successfully adjust to a world where biology was equal to engineering. Chapter IV
looks at the key to remaking the Umatilla: large amounts of water and how it was to
be delivered. And the Conclusion summarizes the place of this program in the larger
context of natural resource allocation in the Columbia River Basin.
By examining this success story, we can better understand some of the
relationships and struggles that keep salmon the top natural resource concern in the
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Pacific Northwest. The Umatilla River is again a salmon stream.V Threats to its
regained status persist, but for now the Umatilla Indians have fulfilled a dream of
generations. It was salmon that enabled Plateau Indians like the Cayuse, Walla
Walla, and Umatilla to make the Columbia region home in the first place. The
Indians were there because of the salmon." Now, the salmon are in the Umatilla
River because of the Indians.
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CHAPTER II-INDIANS, SALMON, ANDHATCHERIES
The last Salmon is divided,
only a segment of understanding
that is accepted with the River.
Placing the Salmon head facing upriver
will demonstrate we have not absolutely conformed.
Only two hundred years from the discovery, dear Chewana
the unfolding of unwritten prophecy,
a Great River is fragmentary holiness.
-Elizabeth WoodyI
THERESTORAnON OFSALMONTOTHEUMATILLARIVER by the
Confederated Tribes is a very specific, local story. Understanding why this is
important on a larger scale, to Indians and salmon, means understanding the nature
of relationships between Columbia River Indians, Pacific salmon, and the artificial
propagation of anadromous fish. Each is complicated enough to justify a full-scale
examination. This study will confine itself to a cursory look at the three, but their
interaction is crucial to comprehending projects like the Umatilla Fisheries
Restoration Program.
If ever the phrase "destinies intertwined" was appropriate or meaningful, it is
in the instance ofIndians and salmon. It is impossible to understand salmon in the
Columbia River Basin (and probably the entire Pacific Northwest) without
understanding their relationship with the native peoples. The two are inseparable.
Historically, mid-Columbia River Indians defined a great part of who they were-
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their material and spiritual culture-by the salmon they caught in the Columbia and
in its tributaries. Salmon sustained body and spirit. And there is evidence that this
relationship was reciprocal; some biologists and scholars believe that Native
American salmon management actually enhanced the runs of anadromous fish2
It is an ancient relationship. The Plateau peoples have depended upon the
salmon runs for thousands of years. It is not a static relationship, but one that has
changed in marked ways over the last hundred years. At its root is, again,
reciprocation. In one of the most poignant legends on the Plateau, the Creator asks
the animal people which of them will be willing to sacrifice their bodies for the good
of the new-come human beings. The salmon people tell the Creator that they will
agree to give up their bodies, but under one condition. They will also relinquish their
voices to the Plateau people, and it will be the responsibility of human beings to be
the voice of the salmon. In other words, it is up to tribal people to speak for salmon,
since salmon have no voice of their own. So their Creator charged the people of the
Plateau with this solemn duty.
The relationship of non-Indian managers to salmon is based on manipulation.
For a hundred years, fish managers tried to engineer salmon stocks to fit the society's
expectations of salmon rather than the needs of salmon. Looking back, their
techniques seem primitive, inept and ignorant. The impact of these primitive
hatchery practices on salmon stocks has been immense. Biologists estimate that up to
90% of all salmon in the Columbia Basin today are descended from hatchery stock. J
The operation and reliance on hatcheries has also affected the view of fish managers.
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Besides relying on this technological management tool for "improving" the survival
of fish, state fish and wildlife agencies also became addicted to the federal funds that
pay for hatchery operations.
State and federal control over fish hatcheries, along with the traditional
distrust between the states and the Tribes, has also retarded meaningful progress
toward coherent policies that will restore salmon. More money for tribal hatcheries
means less money for some other agency. Also, clashes between agency and tribal
scientists over genetically "safe" hatchery practices hamper the development of
cohesive strategies, because in the 1990s the federal government backed away from
hatcheries at the same time that the Tribes turned to hatcheries as a method of
resurrecting dead or dying rivers.
Native people are entitled to a place in the salmon discussion. Northwest
Indians earned their seat at the table in the struggle to make the Treaties of 1855
respected in the 1960s and 1970s, culminating in U.S. vs. Washington.' This chapter
looks at this triangle of relationships-salmon to Indians, salmon to hatcheries, and
Indians to hatcheries-which is one of the central elements in the story of salmon
restoration in the Umatilla River Basin, and in the Columbia Basin as a whole.
The complexity of the salmon crisis is compounded by the complex life
cycles of Pacific salmon. The Columbia River Basin has five species of salmon and
two of anadromous trout. These seven make up the genus oncorhynchus, or "hook
nose." They are the chum, pink, coho, sockeye, and chinook, and the sea-run trout
are the cutthroat and steelhead.' Pink and chum salmon and cutthroat trout rarely if
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ever come upstream as far as Bonneville Dam. Coho (or silver salmon, 0. kisutch),
sockeye (or blueback, 0. nerka), and chinook (called king salmon outside of Oregon
and Washington, 0. tswawycha) migrated into the interior of the Columbia Plateau
in vast numbers. These three salmon, along with the steelhead (the sea-run version of
rainbow trout, 0. mykiss), were heavily relied on by the mid-Columbia River
Indians.
Chinook and to a lesser degree steelhead have evolved into regional and
temporal subspecies. There are winter and summer steelhead (with summer steelhead
having an additional so-called "A" run that migrate slightly earlier than the "B" run).
Chinook have adapted into spring, summer, and fall runs. Fall chinook are further
divided into "bright" and "tule" runs, descriptions based on fish coloration and
behavior; "upriver brights" enter the Columbia early and tend to migrate farther
upstream. Their flesh is much firmer and brings a better price to commercial fishers
than the tules, which are darker fish that enter the Columbia late, already losing
much of their body fat, the fat that makes salmon such a delicacy.
The Umatilla River historically had runs of summer steelhead, coho (a fall
migrator), and spring and fall chinook. For the purposes of this narrative, we will
discuss only these three, since it is these that the Tribes attempted (and continue to
attempt) to restore."
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Indians and Salmon
The relationship between Pacific salmon and Columbia River Indians is a
relationship that has evolved over perhaps 10,000 years. Tribal relationships to
salmon are best understood on their own terms rather than through traditional
scholarly techniques that tend to classify, to categorize, for example, in terms of
instrumentalist, utilitarian, or functionalist. As the scholar Vine Deloria, Jr. has
written, Indian metaphysics are based on individual relationships, rather than
categorized frameworks. "The key to understanding Indian knowledge of the world
is to remember that the emphasis was on the particular, not on general laws and
explanations of how things worked."?
[In the Indian worldview] power and place are dominant concepts-power
being the living energy that inhabits and/or composes the universe, and
place being the relationship of things to each other. It is much easier, in
discussing these Indian principles, to put these basic ideas into a simple
equation: Power and place produce personality. This equation simply
means that the universe is alive, but it also contains within it the very
important suggestion that the universe is personal and, therefore, must be
approached in a personal manner. And this insight holds true because
Indians are interested in the particular, which of necessity must be
personal and incapable of expansion and projection to hold true
universally."
Each relationship requires a measure of respect and reciprocation. Each is
personal, and therefore contains a measure of the sacred. Columbia River Indians
recognized their reliance on this great fish, and reciprocated with ceremonies and
management techniques that aimed at insuring a continued relationship. While it is
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seductive to the scholar to attempt to break down this relationship into three more or
less distinct categories (material, spiritual, and legal), it is reductionist to do so.
Native Americans did not then and most still do not separate the world so neatly. The
dualist worldview of Euro-Americans allows them to easily divide the sacred from
the profane, allowing a clear distinction between Holy Communion and commodity.
Traditionally, Columbia River Indians had no such dual nature, did not divide the
world up into categories, and did not understand this viewpoint. They did not behave
in a secular way during the week, and then a sacred way on Sunday. For them, their
relationship with salmon, elk and deer, and the roots and berries gave sustenance,
and that was to be respected as a sacred relationship. To separate this relationship
into what appear to be the constituent elements of material reliance, spiritual
sustenance, and legal interdependence is somewhat arbitrary, yet however clumsy
these terms are, they are the only tools we have for understanding this complex
weave of relationships.
The first and most obvious element is that of sustenance. People have to eat,
and in the dry Columbia Plateau the most abundant and reliable source of protein
was salmon. Columbia River Indians devised many ways to catch and preserve these
fish for the long winter months when there would be little fresh meat and almost no
other source of protein.
Before non-Indians came to the Pacific Northwest, between 16 and II
million salmon a year entered the Columbia, finding their way up its tributaries to
their natal streams. Native Americans all over the Pacific Northwest caught them in
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great numbers, especially the Indians of the Columbia Plateau. Some scholars
estimate that the Columbia River Indians took around 39% of the fish in the river in
a good salmon year with strong runs of returning fish. In a bad salmon year, Indians
took as much as 67% of the salmon struggling upstream."
Some scholars go so far as to suggest the possibility that native fishers helped
thin the fish so that spawning grounds did not become over-crowded with competing
fish, which helped a higher percentage ofredds (nests) to survive and not be
destroyed by other fish trying to establishing their territory. This idea, then, suggests
that salmon and Indians had a kind of interdependent, symbiotic relationship from
h bezinni 10t every gm mg.
Columbia River Indians' material and social culture became grounded firmly
in the great abundance and desirability of salmon. It took many pounds of dried
salmon to keep a family alive over the long winter months on the frigid plateau.
What people did not need they traded. This trade brought thousands ofIndians to
Celilo Falls during the fishing season to exchange dried salmon for buffalo hides
from Plains Indians to the east, obsidian from the Modoc and Klamath to the south,
and dentalium shells from Chinookan peoples from the coast and lower-Columbia.
These were great social gatherings where
wealth was exchanged and alliances formed. Marriages were arranged,
betrothal ceremonies performed, horses traded and raced, gambling---such
as stick games -was enjoyed, and families were reunited. II
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Salmon brought great material and social prosperity to the people of the Columbia
Plateau.
Despite the incredible amount of fish caught, the salmon always came back;
native fishers did not destroy the runs---quite the opposite. Plateau Indians had a
number of management techniques, many not obviously directed at the fish, but
rather the safety and spiritual health of the clan or tribe. Some restrictions were based
on ceremonies. For example, certain marriages and ceremonies required the fishing
master, or "salmon chief," to declare a day (or week) of no fishing to properly honor
the two families newly joined. If a fisherman fell into the rapids at Celilo and
drowned, the salmon chief would call a halt to the fishing that particular hole for a
period of time to allow that man's spirit to get out of the river. This allowed the
people to avoid the spirit haunting them. 12
Another "technique" depended on a combination of usufructory fishing rights
and a dispersed fishery. Only certain families had rights to fish at certain places on
the river, hereditary rights that were passed down patrilinearly. A man could give
permission to another man to fish from his spot, but it was not given lightly. These
were not rights to own a particular fishing spot, but rights to fish from that
spot--they were usufruct rights. This system effectively regulated fishing at a place
like Celilo Falls since it limited who could fish there. It pushed other fishers onto
other places on the Big River and many others into the tributaries, where Indians
fished effectively with different techniques; the dipnet gave way to the gaff hook.
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This dispersed fishing throughout the plateau so that no one area was too intensively
fished.l]
These techniques resulted in giving salmon a period ofrespite from capture,
what modem salmon managers refer to as "escapement." Those fish were allowed to
travel upstream, to be captured by other hunters--bear, eagle, otter, other people-s-or
to spawn. Other observances had the same effect: ceremonies that required the
cessation of fishing at that particular hole, and thus provided escapement of more
fish. 14
Traditionally mid-Columbia River Indians believe that the Creator sent the
salmon people upstream to sustain humans. Salmon fed the soul as well as the body.
Warm Springs/Wasco poet Elizabeth Woody puts it succinctly: "Salmon was a key
element in the spiritual framework of [native] -people: purity of foods, purity of
thought, purity ofbody.,,15 The most obvious demonstration of this is the "first
salmon ceremony," which is a common ritual with other Tribes throughout the
Northwest: a celebration and reverence of the first foods. Indians all along the
Columbia, whether lower, middle or upper, celebrated the return of the salmon with
a corresponding rigor, depending on how reliant they were on salmon. With local
variations based on the importance of salmon to the tribe, the first salmon was
caught, with great ceremony prepared, and a mouthful was given to all in the tribe. 16
The skin, bones, and viscera were reassembled and put back into the river to swim
back to the sea, to tell the salmon people that they were being respected, that it was
all right to come upstream.
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We should not confuse this concern with the health of the salmon runs with
modern environmentalism. Too often the romantic notion of the Native American as
the "first environmentalists" has clouded a more accurate picture of their interaction
with the land. This interaction is based first and foremost on individual relationships.
Since each relationship, whether with a person, an animal, or the land, is a unique,
particular relationship, each relationship must be taken at face value. Indian
management styles functioned upon an ethic that recognized respect and
reciprocation. It resembled the Euro-American idea of stewardship. Unlike Euro-
Americans, however, their creator required them to show due respect to the other
"peoples" with whom they shared the land. Above all, Native Americans were
pragmatic: respecting the "salmon people" meant maintaining the spiritual health of
the tribe, a kind of enlightened self- interest. 17
Current legal, biological, and economic arguments about salmon restoration,
coupled with much recent scholarship, have downplayed the importance of the
Indians' spiritual relationship with salmon. Anthropologist Eugene Hunn, an
ethnobotanist, has de-emphasized the role of salmon in the spiritual lives of
Columbia River Indians in order to emphasize the undervalued role of women in the
gathering and preparing the many plant resources needed by plateau peoples-s-a
laudable goal, but one gained at the expense of salmon. Historian Joseph Taylor has
effectively argued that Native Americans could and did catch as many salmon as
they wanted without harming the runs. But his emphasis on economic relationships
as determining factors in understanding Indians' contemporary relationship to
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salmon discounts the Indians' spiritual relationship in order to portray Indians as
river user group-e-a political constituency--that have an interest in salmon. This
casts Indians in a very different light, implying that Columbia River Indians are
merely another faction of river users with an agenda for the river, hiding behind the
screen of their religious beliefs to justify their position. IS It is a rather cynical
position that simplifies a factual, historical relationship, one that continues to
motivate the Tribes and is a force in their salmon restoration policies. Indians
themselves use the spiritual aspect of salmon as the basis of their argument less and
less in the current, highly charged political landscape. 19 The fact is, in their own
terms, the respect an Indian pays the animal that keeps him or her alive is a spiritual
relationship. The regard a person has for their own traditions taught by their elders,
the stories and myths that one relies on for guidance, and the ceremonies that one
performs for kith and kin and clan-inasmuch as these are spiritual relationships,
then the relationship of Columbia River Indians to salmon is undeniably spiritual.
While still vital to the culture of plateau people, this relationship has
changed. It has changed because they cannot find sustenance in salmon alone: there
simply are not enough fish to sustain any population of people. Indians still catch
fish on the Columbia, but they sell most of the fish rather than dry it for their own
use. During the fishing season, whites gather at parking lots near boat ramps, to buy
fish from Indian youths who haul great salmon and steelhead out of plastic coolers.
There is also much greater competition for salmon: Indians have had to share this
resource with Euro-American fishers. It is out of this struggle, this competition for a
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scarce resource, that the most modem relationship of Indians to salmon has emerged,
the legal relationship.
Salmon were so integral to the lives of Northwest Indians that they made
fishing a major issue in treaty negotiations with Washington Territorial Governor
Isaac Stevens and Oregon Territory Indian Superintendent Joel Palmer. In 1854 the
United States Government sent Isaac Stevens to facilitate the movement ofIndians
off the land so that white settlement could proceed unabated. With great alacrity,
Stevens convinced the Indians west of the Cascades to sign treaties, and then
proceeded to the dry interior to deal with the east-side tribes, including the Sahaptin-
speaking people of the Columbia Plateau.
Like the west-side Puget Sound Indians, the Plateau People were extremely
unhappy to be asked to give up their lands, more than 12,000,000 acres in Oregon
alone." But they remained adamant on their unimpeded right to fish. Stevens obliged
on the issue of fishing rights, and included language that Native Americans retained
their fishing sites at the "usual and accustomed stations" to fish "in common" with
whites.2! The tribes on both the Puget Sound and the Columbia River were thus
guaranteed their traditional fishing grounds. These were not privileges given to the
Indians by a conqueror, but were rights reserved by an agreement between
sovereigns. These treaties, therefore, should be seen as exchanges, where the Indians
conceded their historic range and in return had their fishing rights recognized by the
United States22 "This guarantees your fish." With these words, Stevens insured
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Indians all over the Pacific Northwest a place at the salmon management table over
one hundred years later. 23
At the time of the negotiations, expediency dictated that Stevens not haggle
overmuch, and he met this condition with few qualms. Both Stevens and Palmer
could see that in their plan of temporary solutions to acculturate the Indians the
Indians would need sustenance." Stevens' thoughts that Indians would never
compete with whites were based on two assumptions about fishing that turned out to
be wrong. The first was that Indian fishing techniques were inefficient. We now
know that a population of fishers capable of taking as much as two-thirds of the
catch could not have been inefficient; Indians were capable of catching as many fish
as they wanted." The second assumption was that the value of salmon to whites was
negligible since there was no large-scale market for it. Local markets for salmon
were small and necessarily confined to areas where salted or jerked salmon could be
shipped without spoiling. The famed international market for canned Columbia River
salmon was still a few years away. Therefore, fishing offered Euro-American settlers
few economic opportunities. In retrospect, it was easy for Governor Stevens to agree
to the Native American position maintaining their unfettered ability to take salmon.
Stevens' assumptions were wrong. The introduction of canning to the Pacific
Northwest in the 1860s created the conditions where white fishers did come into
aggressive competition with Indians. Canning created a method of processing and
transporting salmon thousands of miles without fear of spoilage." When this
technology reached the Pacific Northwest it caused the economic value of salmon to
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skyrocket: The rights only just reserved by Native Americans ten years earlier came
into serious contention with whites as a result of competition with white fishers and
the Tribes' insistence on using their traditional fishing places, some of which were
now private property.
This friction between Indian fishers and non-Indian fishers and landowners
led to major disputes. The general theme in these conflicts is that the state or territory
would rule in favor of non-Indians against the Indians, and then the United States
Supreme Court would overrule the state court in favor of the Indians. The first case
to match this pattern and to reach the Supreme Court was United States v. Winans in
1905. The issue arose over the property right ofthe Winans brothers to build a
fishwheel on a traditional Yakama fishing spot on the Columbia, a "usual and
accustomed" place. The Winans' argued that their property right was assured by the
statehood of Washington. They maintained that statehood negated Article III of the
treaty, which promised Indians the rights to fish at all the usual and accustomed
places, since the land now came under the sovereignty of the State of Washington,
not the United States of America." The state court of Washington agreed. But the
U.S. Supreme Court overruled the Washington court in favor of Native Americans,
saying that they could not be kept from their usual and accustomed places by private
property, since their fishing rights was a kind of property right: With inspired prose,
Justice McKenna wrote that salmon "were not much less necessary to the existence
of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed.v" Three years later, the same
Court ruled that Indian tribes had implied reserved rights to more than just fish. In
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Winters v. United States, the Court ruled that water rights were also held by the tribes
as reserved rights." While this has little to do with fishing, per se, this case has
stunning implications.
The Winans decision made the Treaties of 1855 the law of the land. It laid the
foundation necessary for the Tribes to assert their rights and challenge the
increasingly restrictive fish and game laws of the states. It is unnecessary to recount
here the entire judicial history of Columbia River Indians' fishing rights. But briefly,
four more cases in the late 1960s and 1970s set the stage for the Indians modern role
in the salmon crisis.
The first decision was Sohappy v. Smith in 1969. Based on his interpretation
of the 1855 Treaties and Winans, Federal District Court Judge Robert Belloni ruled
that Indians were entitled to "a fair share" of the salmon in the fishery. In 1974,
Judge George Boldt went one great step further. In United States v. Washington, a
complicated ruling over one hundred pages long, Judge Boldt interpreted Judge
Belloni's "fair share" to mean "equal." He continued by defining equal to be 50% of
the catch. To implement what became Phase I of his decision, Judge Boldt in effect
made himself the fish-master for the Columbia River and Puget Sound. The Boldt
decision granted well-organized tribes like the Yakama the right to self-regulate their
own fishery, and it officially made the Indians full partners in the already complex
world of salmon management. While non-Indian commercial fishers off shore and in
the Puget Sound howled in protest, burning Judge Boldt in effigy, United States v.
Washington became a landmark oflaw for both salmon and Northwest Indians30
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The Supreme Court upheld the Boldt decision in 1979. In Washington v.
Passenger Fishing Vessel Association, Justice Stevens wrote for the majority: "a
treaty, including one between the United States and an Indian tribe, is essentially a
contract between two sovereign nations.?" The Court also interpreted the treaties to
mean more than merely guaranteeing access to fishing places. The treaties intended
the Tribes to "a share of each run" of fish and the share had to be equal." The Court
had put to rest the issue of whether or not the Tribes had a right to the fish.
In 1980 Judge William Orrick handed down his ruling on Phase II of United
States v. Washington. This Phase dealt with two issues that Judge Boldt had set aside
in 1974: the inclusion of hatchery fish to the fishery, and the effect of habitat on
salmon populations. The State of Washington, which only reluctantly implemented
Phase I, had been excluding hatchery fish from state hatcheries from the Indians
share of the 50%.33 Judge Orrick wrote that without hatchery fish (which account for
as much as 90% of the fishery), the treaties would be made meaningless." He
specifically stated that the Indians' 50% included hatchery fish. In regard to habitat,
Judge Orrick also ruled that Washington was to "refrain from degrading the fish
habitat," since that had a desultory effect on overall fish numbers. While the Ninth
Circuit vacated Judge Orrick's ruling on habitat, stating that it was too sweeping a
regulation, it upheld his decision that hatchery fish were part of the equation."
The judicial history ofindian fishing cases combine with the 1907 Supreme
Court decision Winters v. United States to recognize and confirm the legal standing
of Columbia River Indians in salmon management. The Boldt decision is
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fundamental to the mechanics of salmon recovery efforts, because it grants the
Tribes autonomy in managing their own fishery and requires other river users and
managers in the region to sit at the table with treaty Indians.i? Winters v. United
States further enhances the tribal position by recognizing tribal rights to other
resources on ceded lands. The Winters decision will be discussed in detail in Chapter
IV. Briefly, the Winters Court ruled that Indian tribes reserved water rights on their
ceded lands. Because Winters ruled that Columbia River Indians gave up only their
title to the land, retaining rights to water and other resources, Indians have legal
standing in natural resource policy making in the Columbia River Basin. Between
the Boldt decision and the Winters Doctrine, tribes like the Umatilla have the right to
administer fish restoration policies on reservations like the Umatilla, and off the
reservations on the so-called ceded lands, like on the Walla Walla River and the
Grande Ronde River. 37
These rulings enhanced the legal standing of the Tribes within the framework
of fish and rivers management, and from them Indians take the legal strength they
need to advance their ideas on salmon restoration. But the promise of the Treaties
and the law were not enough to keep the Tribes in fish. At the same time that the
courts and the federal government supported the Indians' right to fish, Euro-
Americans continued to alter the environment and so threatened to make many of
those promises irrelevant. Irrigation, as in the Umatilla Basin, destroyed habitat and
eliminated many runs. Logging did the same. Dams not only killed fish as they
passed, but obliterated traditional fishing places and significantly altered the riverine
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environment. In particular, Native Americans saw the drowning of Celilo Falls as a
catastrophe.r" Only in the past twenty years, with the passage of the Northwest
Power Act, have the Tribes been able to promote their own restoration strategy.
Between their determination to keep their traditions alive and favorable
rulings by the courts, the Tribes have forced the machinery of salmon management
in the Pacific Northwest to swing around, away from the ocean fishery that
concerned past hatchery practices. Federal and state fishery managers and politicians
must now address upstream issues that before the Northwest Power Act were only
given cursory inspection. Native peoples capitalized on this new law by pushing for
restoration projects on their reservations and their ceded land.
Salmon and Hatcheries
Hatcheries have operated in the Northwest since the I870s. They were the
cornerstone offish management in the early and middle part of the century,
considered indispensable to maintaining a strong commercial catch. As Historian
Joseph E. Taylor has put it, the state of Oregon assumed it could avoid regulating
overfishing and upstream activity suspected ofharming salmon runs by simply
"making salmon." By removing salmon propagation from uncertain nature to a
scientifically controlled environment, officials did not have to face the consequences
of rampant environmental degradation." The construction and operation of
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hatcheries was far from consistent or credible until the era of the big dams. In the
1940s the federal government became involved in mitigating fish losses inflicted by
mainstem dams. Hatcheries became institutionalized, and were operated in a
rationalized way rather than the haphazard fashion of the nineteenth century. Still,
they proved no more effective in building-up salmon runs.
By the late 1880s, it was clear that the numbers of big chinook were in
decline. Fishers who had never taken anything but chinook now began to pursue
coho and sockeye." In the 1890s, the dip in the catch was profound, with numbers
plummeting from over 40 million pounds to 25 million pounds. The catch would
continue to peak and valley radically until the 1930s.41 Sometimes violent struggles
(called "fish wars") broke out on the lower Columbia, as commercial fishers blamed
rival types of gear for being particularly rapacious. Northwest residents blamed all
commercial fishers for the decline of salmon, with Oregon voters passing several
ballot measures aimed at curbing what they saw as the inevitable extinction of
hi k 42C moo.
But scientists were beginning to understand that more was going on than just
over-fishing. From the 1870s to the 1920s, spawning and rearing habitat were being
destroyed or degraded as the interior of the Northwest was developed. Large-scale
mining operations devastated streambeds. Logging the forests diminished shade of
rivers and increased water volume and sediment loads, burying spawning beds.
Extensive cattle ranches disturbed fragile riparian zones. And more farms on the
semi-arid plateau demanded more irrigation water, sucking rivers dry. It was not any
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one of these practices that depressed the upstream runs, but, as historian William
Robbins has stressed, "it was the combined farm, range, mining, and forest activities
that proved so disruptive to stream and riverine ecology in the region. ,,43
As salmon numbers continued to decline in the 1920s and 1930s, the states of
Washington and Oregon tried to regulate fishing. But the inability to enforce new
regulations hampered the state's efforts. The fish wars heated up as each group of
fishers tried by ballot measure to exclude rival types of gear. Horse seines,
fishwheels, gillnets, and others all came under fire as various groups, including
sports fishers, convinced the public that excessive commercial fishing was
annihilating the Northwest's salmon.44
In order to compensate for both the elimination offreshwater habitat and
overfishing, fish and game managers began to rely on artificial propagation as the
chief tool to insure the continued abundance of salmon. Commercial salmon
interests, sports fishing interests, and fish managers saw hatcheries as the saving
grace. In addition, hatchery production of salmon meant that Northwesterners could
continue their various ways of making a living exactly as they were. Loggers in the
Coast Range and Cascades, farmers, ranchers and miners in the semi-arid interior
could all continue unimpeded by regulation since any harm to the salmon could be
rectified by making more. No regulation of the fishery, nor restrictions on logging
practices, nor new farming techniques were necessary, because fish managers could
produce more salmon by far than were taken."
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Fish managers in the nineteenth-century pursued artificial propagation at a
time when sound, scientific knowledge of salmonid biology and behavior was thin at
best. Experts on salmon, such as Robert Hume and Livingston Stone, were few and
their knowledge dubious. Hume, an acknowledged contemporary expert who grew
rich canning Rogue River salmon, maintained up to his death his conviction that
Pacific salmon did not necessarily die after spawning." Stone was the assistant
commissioner of the United States Fish Commission in charge of Pacific operations.
He maintained that there were no separate strains or subspecies of salmon." To
Stone, a chinook was a chinook. He admitted at one point that he was totally
confused by the behavior of Pacific salmon, because they did not conform to his
expectations from his association with Atlantic salmon. When Stone examined
anadromous fish on the West Coast, he interpreted their behavior according to east-
coast experience. Stone "viewed western nature through eyes trained in the East. He
saw Sa/rna, not Oncorhynchus."48 Not until biologist Willis Rich's 1939 article
contending that each run was could be a subtly different subspecies did science
recognize this possibility. With their incomplete observations, Stone and Hume
typified science's hazy picture of Pacific salmon and the unwarranted faith society
put in hatcheries to maintain fish runs.
This lack of accurate scientific information allowed fish managers to believe
that their techniques were more efficient than nature's. Fish biologists assumed that
hatcheries would be more efficient in producing salmon than natural spawning, and
with reason: hatchery technicians spawned nearly ninety percent of captive eggs into
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fry, as opposed to less than ten percent hatched in the wild.49 This initial
achievement led some to wild predictions of success for full-scale hatchery
production, with the ultimate result in the minds of some of removing all salmon
spawning from risky nature to the safe, efficient confines of the hatchery.
Many ofthe biological pitfalls that modem aquaculture recognizes and
contends with were unforeseen by fish managers of nineteenth century hatcheries,
when the big push to build hatcheries was on. Besides structural problems such
availability of brood stock, availability of clean water, spring freshets that destroyed
primitive hatcheries, and lack of money, there were organic problems, many that
contribute to the degrading of runs today. Hatchery fish tend to spread disease.
Because they are raised under artificial conditions, spending a great deal of time in
unnaturally high concentrations of fish, they contract and spread any number of
diseases, such as bacterial kidney disease.i" Many of these fish must be treated with
hormones and antibiotics as juveniles to contain infection. When these fish are
released they spread disease to wild populations.
Hatchery fish do not survive as well in the wild, yet because of their
numbers, they out-compete wild fish for food." In addition, these huge numbers fish
artificially inflate the total number offish in the fishery, which raises the quota of
"catchable" fish. From this inflated number of available salmon, an inordinately
large percentage of wild fish are caught.
The science of genetics raised other concerns. For some undetermined
reason, fish from hatcheries lack the strong homing instinct of wild fish and do not
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always return to their natal river or hatchery. Biologists are not sure whether
hatchery fish genetically have a harder time finding their natal stream or whether
hatchery practices, such as releasing the fish into a river before they have had the
time necessary to imprint upon the stream. In any case, geneticists theorize that this
increases the chances that hatchery fish with weaker, more limited genetic
backgrounds could mate with wild fish from an entirely different river system. (It
must be said that a certain amount of straying is natural to salmon. In prehistoric
times it would have been the only way that salmon could colonize other rivers and
streams, or recolonize streams where local extinctions had occurred.jf
In short, the millions of domestic salmon released into the environment
compete with wild salmon for food, spread disease, skew the catch quota, and
potentially dilute the genepool. 53 These are now reasonably understood phenomena
today. But in the I890s, they were mysterious and confounding.
Compounding the lack of scientific understanding that hurt fish populations
with poor management was that even when science operated with reasonable
information about salmon and their habits, it was politics, not science, which drove
decisions about the construction and operation of hatcheries. Political pressure from
commercial and sport fishing constituents to use hatcheries to keep the fishery in fish
influenced fish managers. By the I890s, the United States Fish Commission had
developed into a bureaucracy whose decisions became based on production values
rather than scientific observations of success or failure.54 Within this framework of
compensating for the damage done to spawning grounds caused by development of
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resources in the interior and replacing the fish caught in the lower river, there was
precious little room for the biological needs of salmon. The politically driven
machinery of wholesale salmon production had a great impact on wild salmon
stocks, and thus helped impel anadromous fish toward decline. Unaware of these
effects, salmon managers plunged ahead. According to Willis Rich, hatcheries
"probably inflicted as much, or more, damage to the salmon runs as they did service
ofvalue.,,55
This has become a rather tedious list of failures in the struggle to bring
salmon back from the brink of ecological collapse. The point here is that hatcheries
obviously did not reverse the decline of runs in the nineteenth century or early
twentieth century. In the 1940s, the promise of progress that was applied to the river
began to be applied to hatcheries, upgrading the hatchery process from several small,
inconsistently operated hatcheries to state-of-the-art facilities operating with more
substantial budgets in an institutionalized framework. The value of wild salmon runs
was not yet understood or acknowledged by scientists, and the newer hatcheries did
not help wild runs any more than the nineteenth century hatcheries.
The role of hatcheries to offset overfishing and upstream development was
expanded to include the replacement of fish killed at the big federal dams. Biologists
dreaded the impact of Bonneville Dam, because no fish-ladder like Bonneville's had
ever been tested and they feared that even with fish-passage systems there would be
a large adverse impact on migrating fish. Recognizing the potential for loss,
Congress passed the Mitchell Act in 1938. This act aimed to "facilitate conservation
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of the fishery resources of the Columbia River and its tributaries" by providing for
irrigation screens, fish ladders of future dams, and the construction and operation of
fish hatcheries. 56 The Corps built many of these hatcheries just upstream of
Bonneville Dam and many more in the lower Columbia. They were operated by the
state fish and game agencies." By locating the Mitchell Act hatcheries on the lower
Columbia, fisheries managers neglected the upper river runs which were hurt most
by the dams. From an engineering standpoint, this made complete sense: it was far
more efficient to release hatchery fish downstream from destructive dams so that fish
would never have to cope with them. But Fisheries managers and engineers, in
effect, ignored two basic facts. The first was the biological fact that each run of fish
up each tributary had evolved as part of that ecosystem, and that each tributary'S
flora and fauna depended on them. The second fact was the historic dependence of
Indian fishers on these runs. Engineers disregarded human and natural history in
order to achieve greater rational efficiency.
This began the connective relationship of dams and hatcheries. Thus the term
"mitigation" has always meant hatcheries, and has always referred to dams. Other
proposals to assist salmon, such as barging them around dams or drawing down
dams to facilitate migration, are not included in that term. Mitigate meant infusing
the river with young salmon against the effects of the dams. They were not intended
to address the disappearance of habitat, except where habitat was destroyed by the
dams themselves 58 This distinction may seem trivial at this point, but it is important
to understand because terminologies, like everything else in Columbia Basin salmon
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politics, are subject to confusion and strife. For a bureaucracy, exact language is
important. If mitigation means a specific tactic at a specific place, and that definition
is accepted by all political and scientific bureaucracies involved, then to change that
definition can prove very difficult. Bureaucracies are not known for supple
adaptation to change. When the Northwest Power Planning Council redefined the
term "mitigation" in 1982 to apply to salmon and steelhead restoration projects in
Columbia subbasins, "off-site" from the hydroelectric projects that caused the
damage, it found that the bureaucracies that run or the industries that rely on the river
as an engine of commerce did not fully accept its new definition.
The Umatilla River Basin became eligible as an appropriate subbasin for an
off-site mitigation program with the advent of the Northwest Power Act. And with
that eligibility, hatcheries entered a new phase. While acknowledging the past abuses
of hatchery-based management and the present dangers of hatchery fish, the
Northwest Power Planning Council did not abandon the use of hatcheries. In 1982,
the Council simply tried to use them more judiciously. The Council also
provisionally accepted the Tribes' concept of "supplementation," even though this
technique has drawn criticism from biologists who worry about mixing hatchery and
wild stocks of fish. Technically, the Umatilla Fish Restoration Program is a
supplementation program. For the sake of clarity, in order to distinguish the Umatilla
Program from the projects the Yakama have initiated, this paper describes two types
of modem hatchery management: supplementation and restoration.
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Supplementation is a technique that places fish in a stream where salmon and
steelhead runs are distressed. While most fish released from hatcheries are put into
the river with the idea that returns will come back to the hatchery, supplemented fish
are planted in the river where it is hoped they will return and breed naturally with the
wild fish, because they are from native broodstocks. Until very recently, hatchery
technicians were not particular about from where their broodstock came. The run of
fish collected for broodstock might come from a river system far away and have few
of the genetic characteristics similar to the local, native fish. Earlier attempts at
hatchery propagation failed to recognize the genetic damage this could cause. But
supplementation is meant to take all existing biological knowledge and the genetic
characteristics and try to augment numbers in a fragile area to build the existing run
up, rather than try to replace a native run with a hatchery run. Biologists choose
broodstocks from areas geographically and genetically close enough to the
supplemented river, enough that the genetic requirements are extremely similar.i"
Restoration is an approach that reestablishes salmon runs to a river or stream
where salmon have been absent. Just as with supplementation, the choice of
broodstock is important; obviously it cannot be the original genetic material. Fishery
managers want a fish that is as close as possible a match to the original, extinct fish.
Preferably, managers acquire brood stock from a stream nearby with a genepool very
similar to the run under restoration. Restoration is the technique the Tribes used on
the Umatilla60
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Hatcheries have not stopped or reversed the decline of anadromous fish. They
were never intended to preserve wild runs: on the contrary they were to replace them.
Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century fish managers used hatcheries with no
consideration of natural spawning, wild fish. They operated their hatcheries as fish
factories, where they simply produced volumes of "meat" that would end up caught
in the lower Columbia or at sea by commercial or sports fishers and thus provide a
service of value to those fishers. Hatcheries operated under political considerations
inconsistent with modem biological goals."
This, then, begs the question: if hatcheries have been, by and large, a failed
management tool, why should the story of a fish hatchery interest us? Why should
this new hatchery suddenly be successful? The answer is that this restoration attempt
is taking place under unique circumstances. The Tribes are using newer hatchery
techniques and using them in a way never before envisioned. The Umatilla Program
shows us a clear instance ofthe Tribes using the best scientific information available
to take control of their restore their river. The Program it is an example of what can
be accomplished with the cooperation of traditionally hostile agencies, like the
Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, and in spite of hindering bureaucracies.
Indians and Hatcheries
If the relationship of Indians to salmon is complex and rich in tradition, then
the relationship of Indians to hatcheries is downright complicated and fraught with
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disputed science and divisive politics. Native Americans have turned to technology
to restore a river and its salmon degraded largely by non-Indians' use of technology.
As Indians use hatcheries, they confront a scientific community that, although a
party to the unrestrained dependence on hatcheries for over one hundred years, has
come to view hatcheries dubiously. Many non-tribal biologists and environmental
groups have questioned any continued reliance on hatcheries. Non-tribal river
managers and biologists have concluded within the last decade that the overall effect
of hatcheries on the fishery has been disastrous. The Tribes counter that they are
using hatcheries as a tool in a much different fashion than state fish and wildlife
agencies have traditionally used them and therefore the Tribes should proceed.f
These new hatchery programs are much different from the traditional Euro-
American hatchery programs." They rely on a strategy that the Northwest Power
Planning Council's Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program in 1982 called
"reprogramming. "
There are two aspects to this idea of reprogramming the Columbia's man-
made salmon runs. The first concerns the locations of hatchery releases into the
river." In the I940s when the Mitchell Act hatcheries were first implemented they
focused on the lower Columbia. The Army Corps of Engineers and fish managers
established the existing hatchery system where it made good engineering and
economic sense: if dams hurt salmon and steelhead why make fish in places where
those fish would have to pass many dams? But this helped only lower-river fishers
and ignored the tribal fishery. The Council's reprogramming of the hatchery system
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would augment and not ignore salmon populations in the middle and upper river
system.
Reprogramming also refers to changing the way the Tribes operate the
hatcheries themselves. Tribal hatcheries are built on the "gravel to gravel" concept.
Natural ponds hold juvenile fish to acclimate to the new "natal" stream, and where
biologists hope these fish will come back to spawn naturally. This differs from older
style "meat" hatcheries, hatcheries which are only concerned with pumping large
quantities of fish into the fishery, where fish reared in concrete pools return
exclusively to the hatchery and are spawned artificially by man. For example, the
Shoshone-Bannock Indians use in-stream boxes to incubate eggs directly in the river.
This alleviates the need to raise the salmon in cement tanks65 Then, when these
salmon return, biologists hope as many fish as possible spawn in the gravel of their
home river, where they were acclimated, even if they were spawned in a hatchery.
The Tribes' hatchery policy recognizes that salmon and steelhead that leave a
hatchery merely to return to that hatchery does not mimic nature. Rather than
perpetuate a policy of meat hatcheries at the expense of the environment, Indians are
promoting a more natural system.
Reprogramming the rivers to mimic upper river salmon runs is fundamentally
different from the totally unnatural way traditional hatcheries functioned. It is also
far from the position of several environmental groups that fish managers cease all
hatchery releases because of the potential damage hatchery fish can do to wild runs.
This stance of the Tribes, right between agency fish managers and their factory
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hatchery techniques, and many environmentalists and their insistence on a ban of
hatchery fish, is consistent with the idea that Indians are not environmentalists as we
are familiar with the term. Rather, they are pragmatic managers with respect for the
land and its animals. The Tribes have a cultural interest in having salmon return to
tributary rivers and streams of the Columbia. It is important to them that their people
be able to catch a fish in the river for both sustenance and ceremony. It is likewise
important economically that their commercial interest on the mainstem be successful.
By not being purists in the sense of despising hatchery fish versus wild, they have
kept their management options open.
The Tribes watched as the Mitchell Act hatchery system failed to take the
mid- and upper-Columbia areas into consideration. The Tribes gained ground in their
attempt to challenge state and federal monopoly on hatchery, beginning with Judge
Orrick's ruling in Phase II of u.s. v. Washington in 1980. In Phase II, the court ruled
that the 50% share guaranteed by the Treaties included hatchery fish, even if those
fish were reared by the states. Then, in 1982, the Council's interpretation of the
Northwest Power Act opened the door for tribal projects that attempt to restore fish
on or near the reservations by recognizing the need for a tribal role, and specifically
by affirming projects on the Yakama and the Umatilla rivers.
Politically, the timing of Native American interest in hatcheries presented the
authorities that run the river with an awkward situation. Hatcheries had fallen out of
favor with biologists and environmentalists just as Indian peoples had acquired the
political influence to change the emphasis fisheries managers put on the lower
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Columbia with the Mitchell Act hatcheries. Since the late 1980s, this has exacerbated
feelings of animosity between white fisheries managers and the Indian tribes. The
implementation of the Mitchell Act shows the degree to which fishery managers
ignored Indian interests. By the mid 1970s, the Mitchell Act hatcheries, as they
became known, were established almost exclusively in the lower Columbia, far from
the mid- and upper-basin, where the damage from the dams was really taking its toll.
For example, when the Army Corps of Engineers built John Day Dam it included
two hatcheries in the blueprints, one the Oregon side and one on the Washington
side. After the 1969 United States v. Oregon, in which Judge Belloni ruled that
Indians were entitled to an "equal share" of the fish, the Corps moved those John
Day hatcheries downstream, where they augmented the lower Columbia. The Corps
gave no rationale, but this correlation between a court decision that recognized
Indian rights to more and the elimination of an up-river hatchery suggests that fish
and wildlife agencies were concerned not about the Indians, but downstream non-
tribal fishers.66
For decades fish managers saw fish culture as the centerpiece of salmon
management. But when it carne time to help the tribes with hatcheries, non-Indian
biologists were now saying that every salmon run in most streams or stream systems
was a discrete subspecies that should not be displaced by artificial propagation.
Tribal biologists maintain that, while there certainly are genetic traits that appear in
differing runs of fish, there far fewer separate runs than many biologists claim. This
is the essence of the "splitters versus lumpers" debate, a scientific debate with
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political overtones. The splitters are those who divide stocks of salmon into ever-
finer distinctions and believe that all runs are subspecies not to be diluted with fish
from other stocks. Lumpers are those who feel there are far too many such
distinctions, that anadromous fish have much more in common genetically to one
another-i-esentially, that "a chinook is a chinook"-and tend to "lump" all fish
together. 67
This turn-around by non-tribal biologists from whole-hog artificial
production with undifferentiated stocks to a cautious, anti-hatchery attitude comes at
the exact time that Columbia River Indians have settled on a strategy of using
hatcheries to rebuild runs. This coincidence contributes to an overall attitude of
mistrust by tribal fish managers. The Tribes have come to regard almost any attempt
to advocate for wild fish, however well intended, as stalling and a disregard for their
treaty rights. For example, tribal biologist Douglas Dompier argues that genetic
diversity was merely a buzzword and an excuse not to act, and retain control over
hatcheries. He maintains that the agencies responsible for salmon management have
long excluded the Tribes from the decision making process. As biologists more fully
understand the detrimental effect of hatchery fish on wild runs, the argument against
the wholesale production of hatchery fish seems reasonable. But the Tribes, who had
at one time agreed that wild fish were the way to go, have pushed now for any fish.
Hatchery fish will do.
Characterizing the debate as between splitters and lumpers is an over-
simplification. The two conflicting views on fish genetics, at its core a scientific
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issue, has become a political issue. The Tribes see these political arguments as a
distraction from the source of the major cause ofloss on the river. They see the big
dams causing far more "genetic" damage than hatchery fish. The Tribes also see
little similarity between traditional hatcheries that released huge volumes of salmon
into the fishery, and their design of small, gravel-to-gravel hatcheries. It is the scale
of the tribal hatchery program, not necessarily the hatcheries themselves, which
alarms many noteworthy biologists.f The Tribes have plans for many such
supplementation hatcheries on many of the rivers in their ceded lands, including the
Walla Walla and Grande Ronde.
In an article partially funded by Oregon Trout, four prominent biologists
criticized the technique of supplementation (placing hatchery-raised salmon and
steelhead side by side with wild fish in an attempt to bolster the natural stocks) as
"not only ... inconsistently defined, but so many methods and objectives are espoused
as to make the term meaningless." The report questioned the aggressive use of
supplementation programs without adequate scientific evaluation of the results.i"
One such project is the Yakima River supplementation program, where hatchery fish
are put into the Yakima basin right next to wild fish in order to encourage those
hatchery salmon to return and interbreed with wild fish. This is exactly contrary to
what biologists have been recommending in recent years, and the difficulty of
addressing those concerns have hampered the Yakima Program and increased its cost
substantially.
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In the Umatilla River story, these issues were absent because it is a
restoration project. The biological hazards associated with hatcheries were greatly
reduced because there was no original genepool to thin out. The Umatilla program
does not augment a distressed wild population, it replaces non-existent fish. The
problems of inter-breeding, straying and thinning of the genepool at-large, and
competition with wild fish are of far less concern, though they are not totally
eliminated.
In addition to genetic concerns, day-to-day hatchery problems persist: the
availability of clean water or the outbreak and spread of disease. There is also-and
this is especially true of the Umatilla-the very real problem of habitat. Hatchery
fish will have no more luck in a dry river than did their predecessors. Fortunately for
the Umatillas, the controversy over the appropriate hatchery strategy did not hinder
their program. The Northwest Power Planning Council gave the Tribes the vehicle
they needed to effect change, and they seized it.
FOR 150 YEARS,COLUMBIARlVERINDIANShave struggled to maintain
meaningful treaty rights. For more than one hundred years, fish managers have used
hatcheries as a primary tool in their struggle to maintain viable salmon runs. For the
last twenty years, the Tribes have tried to wrest some measure of hatchery
production from the monopoly of state fish and game agencies. They began to realize
success with the Northwest Power Planning Council's Fish and Wildlife Program,
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which simultaneously solicited suggestions for rebuilding the salmon runs while
expanding the concept of mitigation.
A minor event in 1992 highlighted the confusing and complex nature of the
current hatchery controversy. The Oregon Department ofFish and Wildlife (ODFW)
had a stock of chinook that had been scheduled for release from its hatchery on
Lookingglass Creek. Due to concerns over genetic issues, ODFW decided to destroy
the 800 salmon rather than release them. A group ofIndians threatened to break into
the hatchery and free the chinook in the Grande Ronde River so that they might
spawn if ODFW did not release these fish.?" This event shows the ambivalence of the
state's position: ODFW receives federal funds to operate fish hatcheries, yet
indiscriminate dumping of hatchery-raised salmon put wilds stocks at risk. This
situation where the Department's decision is ostensibly dictated by science is
compounded by politics. ODFW's mission was to provide fish for its constituents,
mostly sports anglers who pay a license fee for the privilege. But Indians do not pay
state license fees; the treaties make them exempt from such regulations. Caught in a
"Catch-22," the Department grows some fish in a hatchery, and then refuses to
release the fish in Indian country on the stated grounds that the chinook could have
an adverse effect on the genetic diversity of wild fish. Thus it appeared to Native
Americans that ODFW's policy was motivated by a concern for its traditional
constituents (non-tribal sports and commercial fishers), not for the tribal fishery. This
kind of muddied policy succeeds only in breeding mistrust with the Tribes71
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The role of Native Americans in the Northwest salmon crisis takes the issue
far beyond the stark, black-and-white positions taken between environmentalists and
extractors, and makes it one of the most complex natural resource issues in the
nation. Native Americans do not necessarily stand with environmentalists, but
neither do they extract wealth in the way Euro-American capitalists do. Their
traditional life of hunting and gathering was altered forever by the white invasion of
their land. With growing recognition of their legal rights, the Umatillas have taken
advantage of statutory changes in the hydropower system in order to restore their
river and their cultural center.
The spiritual character of salmon to Indians may seem compromised in the
face of hatcheries. Can one have a spiritual relationship with hatchery-reared fish?
But the issue is not so narrow as hatchery versus wild salmon. The Umatillas are
striving to rehabilitate a landscape that they have always revered. Salmon were
historically a part of that landscape. They have done more than just make hatchery
salmon. They have restored long-abused streamsides to enhance salmon (and
thereby, many other animals') habitat. For a people to have a spiritual relationship
with the land, the land must be healed first, by almost any means. But to heal the
land, the Umatilla Indians had still to overcome the federal bureaucracy that operated
the hydropower system: the Bonneville Power Administration.
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CHAPTER III-THE SEMANTICS OF CONSERVATION: IMPLEMENTING THE
UMATILLA RIVER FISHERIES RESTORATION PROGRAM
Liberated reason can reveal what a river or a valley needs for its own
realization, what values it may have beyond serving as a means to profit or
amusement, what moral claims it makes on humans.
-Donald Worsterl
WITHTHENORTHWESTPOWERPLANNINGCOUNCIL'Sadoption of the
Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, the Umatilla River stood on the
threshold of change. Everything necessary seemed to be in place: the statutory
framework establishing salmon restoration as a priority in the Columbia River Basin,
the partnership of will and expertise needed for such an undertaking, and the money
required for expensive rehabilitation.
Passage in 1980 of Northwest Power Act tied the generation of hydroelectric
power to the health of anadromous fish runs, and explicitly made salmon and
steelhead equal partners with the hydropower system. The Act instructed the Council
not only to halt the damage dams were doing to salmon runs, but also to reverse the
damage. This repair-work to the runs was not confined to swapping live hatchery
salmon for losses attributed to hydropower on the mainstem: the Act recognized that
the Columbia and its tributaries should be treated "as a system," and that habitat
enhancement was an inseparable part of restoration? In order to fund this restoration,
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the Act instructed the Bonneville Power Administration to pay for all mitigation
efforts recommended by the Council.
The Act, in effect, meant that Bonneville must expand the reasons for its
existence. After 1980, it became legally responsible for funding fish mitigation and
restoration projects on a massive scale. But individuals can read statutes many
different ways, and accordingly can control how a bureaucracy responds. It became
clear to observers of the Umatilla program that Bonneville's Fish and Wildlife
Division was stalling its implementation. One key to figuring out BPA's resistance to
the program is in the type oflanguage that its agents used in the dialogue between
Bonneville, the Council, and the Tribes. By examining Bonneville's language we can
get a glimpse of Bonneville's rationale for stalling and trying to kill or control the
program. Language is important because through it we can understand that this
agency, charged with funding what would become the most expensive wildlife
restoration effort in history, was not proceeding in a frame of mind desirable for
achieving biological goals. An examination of the language Bonneville used in its
correspondence with the Tribes and the Council shows that individuals within BPA's
new fish and wildlife division at were operating from within the realm of the cost-
benefit analysis. These bureaucrats had great difficulty adjusting could adjust to a
world where biology was equal to engineering.
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New Alliances and a Bold Plan
Even before passage of the Northwest Power Act, the Tribes had worked to
patch together a fragile alliance between traditional enemies. By the late 1970s,
CTUIR had brokered tentative agreements to study fish prospects in the region with
all the federal, state, and local entities that could influence salmon restoration in the
Umatilla River: the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (which had built the infrastructure
used by the irrigators), the U.S. Forest Service (in whose territory the Umatilla's
headwaters lie), the Oregon Department ofFish and Wildlife (the state agency
responsible for hatchery management), the four local irrigation districts (the
organizations that had bled the river dry), and the Bonneville Power Administration.
Three things came out of this initial affiliation. First, CTUIR acquired
funding from BPA to conduct research on fish passage in the many irrigation
diversions on the Umatilla. Second, a cooperative effort by local chambers of
commerce, irrigation districts, fishery experts from the Tribes, and the state and
federal governments supported the Bureau of Reclamation's instream flow study,
which would examine how more water could be brought to the river. Third, the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service issued a BPA-funded study on the existing
supply of water flowing through the Umatilla Reservation and how this water might
accommodate a fish hatchery. Under the impetus and leadership of the Confederated
Tribes, there seemed to be a new consensus dedicated to the idea of returning salmon
to the barren Umatilla3
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Striking among these relationships was the new alliance between ODFW and
CTUIR. Historically, states and Indian tribes had opposed one another over fish
policies, and the federal courts had resolved these conflicts. The legal record, from
United States v. Winans, to United States v. Oregon, to the Boldt decision,
demonstrates clearly that states have been in contention with Indians over treaty
rights to fish since the nineteenth-century." The Northwest Power Act instructed both
the Council and the BPA administrator to "encourage the cooperation, participation,
and assistance of appropriate Federal agencies, State entities, State political
subdivisions, and Indian tribes" in order to facilitate the Council's plan." The State of
Oregon showed unprecedented cooperation in working through its fish agency, the
Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, to help the Tribes establish a fish hatchery
system. ODFW assisted by drafting the report describing the project. 6 It also gave
technical help in the actual building of the hatcheries and training tribal personnel in
hatchery operations.
At first, ODFW and CTUIR decided that a single small-scale facility to
supplement the last wild steelhead in the basin would best suit the Tribes' long-term
goals. Their decision was based primarily on the limitation of funds available before
1980. With the passage of the Power Act in 1980, their vision broadened. The Tribes
presented a plan to the Council that showed a series of facilities scattered across the
basin. These facilities would de-centralize the hatchery process, with different
facilities that could collect, transport, hatch, and rear salmon and steelhead, allowing
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more time for the juvenile fish to imprint on their home streams and improve their
rate of return.
The plan created by the Tribes and ODFW was a remarkable blend of
technology and nature, an idea attempted in the past but unsuccessfully. What made
the Umatilla Fish Restoration Program unique was that these new hatcheries would
not be "meat" hatcheries. These new fish would not be factory fish, generic salmon
merely adding to the total numbers of fish in the fishery the way that the Mitchell
Act hatcheries in the lower-Columbia had done. Tribal fish technicians would
recapture some fish at an adult holding facility built at Threemile Dam and
artificially spawn them for broodstock, but they would allow most ofthe strongest
salmon--and this is what made the Umatilla program so unique-- to remain in the
river, to swim upstream into the tributaries and spawn naturally. Fish managers
would rely on nature, not the hatchery, to propagate most of the salmon in the basin.
Also included in the program were screens for irrigation ditches, and stream
restoration to repair the degraded river, passage facilities at the small irrigation dams
at Echo and elsewhere. The Confederated Tribes and ODFW planned reintroduce
salmon to the waters of the Umatilla.
If the strategy of rebuilding the Umatilla runs through a combination of
natural and artificial means was unique in the United States, so was the technique.
The Umatilla program was different from orthodox hatcheries in several respects. It
was decentralized. Dispersed throughout the Umatilla and its tributaries were five or
six different facilities for holding and spawning adults, pools for growing fry, and
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ponds to acclimate juveniles. Because the system was based on restocking the basin
with fish that would spread throughout the basin and spawn naturally, it was
necessary that the fish not be spawned and reared at a single site. A typical meat
hatchery has a weir extending across the stream up which the fish travel. The weir
prevents all fish from swimming any farther upstream. The fish are guided up a short
ladder and into a concrete pool where they mill around until technicians decide to
spawn them. In the Umatilla Program, adults are collected at Threemile Dam, but
they are spawn and fry are reared at facilities far upriver on the reservation: at Thorn
Hollow, Gibbon, Meacham Creek, or Minthorn Springs. After the fry get to a
specific size, they are placed in a pond with a natural bottom at Bonifer Springs on
Meacham Creek, the main tributary of the upper Umatilla. There they grow into
smolts, imprinting on Meacham Creek for their eventual return trip.
When the Council adopted its Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife
Program in 1982, it made special mention of the Umatilla in a subsection entitled
"Construction of Major Hatchery Facilities." Section 704(i)(I) stated that
Bonneville shall fund the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian
Reservation to design, construct, operate, and maintain juvenile release
and adult collection and holding facilities on the reservation .... Bonneville
also shall fund the construction of a facility to increase the existing
hatchery production to provide for an additional 200,000 summer
steelhead smolts for release in the Umatilla juvenile release and adult
collection and holding facilities7
With this firm if unspectacular statement, the Council officially backed the
Confederated Tribes' plan to resurrect the Umatilla River. It seemed as though the
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Council was wasting no time implementing the parity promise." Each individual
component was small in scale. Yet taken together, this system comprised a large-
scale and ambitious project. Nowhere else in the United States have humans restored
naturally spawning salmon runs that were once extinct.
In 1982, the Council endorsed this plan devised by the Confederated Tribes
and Oregon Department ofFish and Wildlife. But the Tribes sensed a bureaucratic
inertia that plagued projects like theirs. Many times in the past, there would be much
talk, promises made, but nothing had happened. Therefore, the Confederated Tribes
decided on a "proactive" approach, even ifit was highly controversial. Tribal
members acquired a number of tule chinook from a federal hatchery down the
Columbia. Tules are type offall chinook far less desirable to commercial fishers
because they bring less at market. (The stock the Tribes originally wanted was
denied them at first by the National Marine Fisheries Service because NFMS did not
consider the Umatilla a candidate for a "terminal fishery" due to the poor condition
of the river.) The Indians released these fish into the river and announced to
Bonneville that there would be adult salmon coming up the Umatilla around 1988.9
This was an audacious move. By acting unilaterally, the normally cooperative
Umatillas risked alienating their irrigating neighbors, BPA, and worst of all, the
Council. BPA did indeed resent this move, but it was helpless. 10 In four years
chinook would return to the river. If the Council, BPA, and the state government did
not address the issues of water allocation on the Umatilla--the very issue that had
killed off the Umatilla runs in the first place-s-then there would not be a river for
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them to ascend. A potential public relations disaster faced fish management
agencies: the spectacle of huge salmon stranded at the mouth of a non-existent river.
Such a scene was not in the State's, the Council's, or Bonneville's best interests.
It is important to note that this was out of character for the Confederated
Tribes. Their typical method of dealing with the river establishment was to
"negotiate rather than litigate," and they did so with infinite patience. I I They did go
back to that strategy in the struggle to re-water the river. It was a curious deviation
from the Tribes' method of operation, justified in the minds of the fishery as
necessary to force past what the Tribes' saw as the typical sluggishness of
bureaucrats who tended to discuss a problem ad nauseum before taking any action.
In 1983, the Tribes and ODFW formally submitted to the Council and BPA
their request for funding the first Umatilla project, the Minthorn Springs holding
facility. 12 This was the first critical point. Here was a project, which had the highest
priority of the Northwest Power Planning Council. Bonneville had approved and
funded its preliminary planning. State fish and wildlife experts agreed that it would
be highly beneficial to salmon in the Columbia Basin. But just as it was ready to
begin the purchase and construction stage, at this critical point that the Bonneville
Power Administration--which had funded and endorsed the program's studies,
which the Northwest Power Act now required to fund the construction of the
program--balked. BPA began, through a series of confusing maneuvers, to avoid
paying for this revolutionary project.
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Cost-Benefit versus Cost Effective
From the time of its creation in 1938, the Bonneville Power Administration
marketed the power generated by the big dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers to
pay back the federal treasury for the system's construction costs. I] In the American
engineering tradition of total rationalization, the water of the entire basin was
harnessed for the "multiple uses" of people: hydropower, irrigation, flood control,
and transportation. 14 Even the Columbia's headwaters were not immune. A 1961
treaty encouraged the Canadians to build reservoirs in Canada to control the Spring
freshet in exchange for hydroelectricity. IS Engineers secured virtually every drop of
the river's water for the use of humans.
In 1980, Bonneville's burden changed. The Northwest Power Act required
BPA to fund all fish mitigation efforts endorsed by the Northwest Power Planning
Council. Bonneville had funded various fish and wildlife studies in the Columbia
River Basin, but it had never given funds to any series of projects on the vast scale
that the Northwest Power Act anticipated.
Bonneville began to resist funding the Minthorn Springs acclimation facility
and the Tribes and ODFW entered into a struggle with Bonneville over the program.
This struggle is very confusing but highly instructive, especially if we understand a
little of the history of Columbia River development. This bureaucracy, so
accustomed to operating the river as a machine, was uncomfortable its new role
facilitating fish mitigation. 16 The ultimate nature of this struggle revolves around
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perceptions of the river, and the language that agencies use to describe those
perceptions. Up until 1980, efficiency was foremost in the minds of engineers. The
Northwest Power Act challenged the notion of the river as an efficient machine.
This chapter stresses the difference between the two terms "cost-benefit
analysis" and "cost effectiveness." While seemingly a question of semantics, the
differences between these terms and the way river managers used them, are actually
charged ideologically. "Cost-benefit analysis" is a term of engineers and urban
planners, examining the comparative worth of new infrastructure and deciding based
on that comparison whether to construct such improvements. "Cost effective" is a
term that, in Columbia River salmon restoration, refers to projects already accepted,
where the issue is not whether to build, but which is the least expensive way to build.
On the Columbia, the old terminology represents a system in which hydropower is
considered superior to salmon, whereas cost effectiveness, with its primary emphasis
on accomplishing biological objectives, works to promote the Northwest Power
Act's demand for equity. As will become clear from the letters, memos, and reports
issued by Bonneville during this period, BPA clearly was still rooted in the old way
of running the river.
Up to this point, debates on the impact of development projects on Columbia
River salmon in the Basin were conducted in the language of the cost-benefit
analysis. Cost-benefit analysis is a method of examining a project's financial
viability by comparing monetary costs against its monetary benefits. It is a
completely rational tool for gauging whether public works projects warrant the
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expense. In the case of projects with effects on wildlife, however, there is a problem.
The biological needs of an ecosystem do not conform to an engineer's
measurements. In other words, they cannot be evaluated mathematically. On the
Columbia and Snake, the engineers' rational decisions did not favor salmon.
Unfavorable cost-benefit analyses did stall some of the dams for as much as ten
years, but never because salmon were part of the unacceptable cost. Ultimately, once
the era of building the big dams commenced in 1938 with Grand Coulee and
Bonneville, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers built every big dam that was part of
its "308" report, except Asotin on the Snake. I) By the late 1970s, most wildlife
managers had accepted that the methodology of cost-benefit analysis was
"inappropriate" when dealing with fish mitigation. 18
There are three principal reasons why cost-benefit analysis is an erroneous
and obsolete approach to management of the Columbia River. The first is the
difficulty of attributing a dollar value to biodiversity. Salmon are exactly in the
middle of the riparian and oceanic food webs as both prey and predator. They are a
critical food source for seals, sea lions, orcas, bears, osprey, eagles, other fish, and
humans. In addition, there are the trillions of insects and microorganisms at the base
of the food web that depend on the biomass of many millions of pounds of dead
salmon in the arid environment east of the Cascades, breaking this protein down
further into basic nutrients for the ecosystem. So too the salmon's offspring---fry and
fingerlings--need the insect life attracted by the carcasses of their parents as
nourishment to survive and to become prey for other creatures. It is impossible to
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gauge this enormous biological wealth of salmon, living and dead, in terms of
dollars. 19 Since no dollar value can be ascribed here, there must be a blank in that
column of the cost-benefit analysis. In rationalized economic terms, the wealth that
contributes to the well being of several ecosystems simply does not exist.
Cost-benefit analysis also cannot measure the cultural and religious value of
salmon to Columbia River Indians. The Treaty of 1855 between the United States
and the Walla Walla, Cayuse, and Umatilla peoples recognized the ceremonial and
subsistence value of salmon. Court decisions have upheld this Treaty.i" While the
economic importance to the Tribes of salmon restoration was addressed by the Boldt
decision, the full necessity of salmon to native peoples cannot be conveyed in a cost-
benefit analysis since there is no way to measure economically the spiritual value of
salmon." Ignoring this spiritual connection amounts to impeding the Treaty Tribes'
free exercise of religion. Nonetheless, federal agencies have tried to create some
basis for measurement. In a 1984 letter, the National Marine Fisheries Service, in
rejecting the Tribes' request for young fish with which to start their hatchery, wrote:
A difficulty in determining economic values lies in a lack of evaluation
techniques that describe monetary benefits for Indian ceremonial and
subsistence fisheries and the social well-being of the CTUIR. We realize
that there are attributes of a BR [Bureau of Reclamation] flow project that
benefit the CTUIR goal of a terminal fishery on your land. There simply is
not a way for us to assign monetary benefits to the BR project for meeting
this goal. If you have any suggestions on how we may assign economic
values to such ceremonial and subsistence fisheries, we would greatly
appreciate hearing your views. 22
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By referring to the spiritual aspect of salmon as ceremonial, NMFS showed that it
was either ignorant of the connection between ceremonial and religious or that it
simply did not care. In any case, this is no different from asking a Jew how much the
Wailing Wall in Jerusalem is worth, or a Catholic the value of Holy Communion, or
a Baptist the cost of his prayer. It graphically demonstrates how bureaucrats, within
the framework of their language, pursue policies that can undermine the cultural
rights of native peoples.
It is difficult to argue from a purely economic point of view, with the salmon
fishing industry a shadow of what it once was, that rehabilitating salmon runs is
worthwhile. In the absolute economic terms of a cost-benefit analysis, engineers are
justified in trading-off the greater wealth produced by the dams in versus the
extinction of the salmon fishing industry. But this lumping oflocal economies into a
single regional formula has, according to William L. Lang, "effectively homogenized
space by making economies unidimensional." Each community on the river had its
own economy based at least in part on when and where the salmon ran and where
they were caught. Cost-benefit analysis looks only at proscribed economic
measurements to determine total overall wealth. It is incapable of examining the
equity of what is lost.23 It does not take account where losses occur and how they
affect those local communities. Because salmon fishers on the lower river are not
going to become aluminum factory owners or dam engineers or construction workers
on the mid- and upper-Columbia River dams, those fishers suffer a net loss. Cost-
benefit analysis reduces local economic losses to a set of numbers, and ignores the
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resulting social costs entirely. Similarly, the social values ascribed to the biodiversity
of salmon populations are nonexistent. In 1980, the Northwest Power Act codified
these values into law. This inherent inequity in cost-benefit analysis is precisely why
it is incompatible with the Northwest Power Act and its promise of parity." While
many would argue that cost-benefit analysis has a place in Columbia River
management, it is inappropriate when dealing with projects that have biological
rather than monetary goals.
The idea of moving away from cost-benefit analysis concerning biological
imperatives was not new with legislation like the Northwest Power Act. In 1958, The
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act altered the perception of fish and wildlife
managers. The legislative history of the Coordination Act states "cost-benefit
justification offish and wildlife measures is both unnecessary and undesirable."
While the Coordination Act in itself has not succeeded in defending fisheries from
development projects, in it Congress' debate laid the intellectual and political
groundwork for the rejection of cost-benefit analysis from the discourse.f
The emphasis of the Northwest Power Act is not on new development, but on
mitigating the biological impacts of old development. Because of the Act's positive
instruction for such mitigation projects, there is no element of should or should not
build based on economics. NPPC-affinned projects will be built. The issue is not if,
but how. To gauge the costs of projects that have biological goals rather than
economic ones, fishery managers require a different method. For the new
construction of the fish enhancement projects set forth by the Columbia River Basin
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Fish and Wildlife Program, the method biologists use is a "cost effectiveness" or
"least cost" method. That is, out of a given set of options, the cheapest alternative is
permissible, so long as it follows the sound biological objectives set forth in the
Council's Fish and Wildlife Program. Clearly, the cost-benefit analysis was no
longer the determining criterion of fish and wildlife policy.i"
What is potentially confusing about the historical record is that BPA does not
use the term "cost-benefit analysis." Those words never appear together. Rather, it
uses the term "cost effectiveness," which after 1980 became the politically correct
term. Yet when looking at the record, there is a consistent pattern ofBPA's Fish and
Wildlife Division interpreting data as ifit was using a cost-benefit analysis, not a
least cost or cost effective method. This is evident in the way that BPA discussed the
funding of projects. If the Fish and Wildlife Division had truly been using least cost,
then it might have come up with alternate strategies for the Tribes and ODFW to
pursue the biological goal of bringing salmon back to the Umatilla River. But what
actually appears in the record is quite different. BPA consistently interpreted cost
effectiveness to mean "benefits should equal costs," not "benefits by the least
cost. ,,27 By effectively hiding behind the words "cost-effective," BPA ignored the
spirit of the Northwest Power Act while following its letter. Using this model, BPA
would not have to fund any project that did not meet its expectations.
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The Struggle for Control
From the beginning in 1980, it was clear that BPA was slow to adapt itself to
the Northwest Power Act. Its attitude shows in the language it used in a press release
from that same year commenting on a spill of water intended to speed salmon
srnolts' trip to the sea. This communique lamented that "[t]his week power dams on
the Columbia River will waste more water than usual," expressing the view that
water allocated to salmon (indeed, all water "unused") instead of hydropower or
irrigation was without worth, that resources diverted for the benefit of fish was
squandered."
When Bonneville did adapt to its new task, it created its own Fish and
Wildlife Division. The Northwest Power Act states that the "Administrator" ofBPA
shall use the Bonneville Power Administration fund and the authorities
available to the Administrator under this Act and other laws administered
by the Administrator to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife to
the extent affected by the development and operation of any hydroelectric
project of the Columbia River and its tributaries in a manner consistent
with the plan ... and the purposes of this Act.29
In addition, Bonneville "and other Federal agencies responsible for. .. operating"
hydro projects in the basin
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shall ... exercise such responsibilities, taking into account at each and every
relevant stage of the decisionmaking processes to the fullest extent
practicable, the program adopted by the Council under this subsection.'?
BPA was also to "consult" with the U.S. Department of the Interior, NMFS, the state
fish and wildlife agencies, the Tribes, and the operators offederal and non-federal
darns. This instruction implied a new level of involvement that BPA had to meet.
Ostensibly, the purpose ofBPA's new Fish and Wildlife Division was to coordinate
the expert resources to make the Council's the Fish and Wildlife Program function."
However, its actual function seemed to be to protect ratepayers' investments in the
Fish and Wildlife Program by making sure they were cost effective. With regard to
the Umatilla River program, this division had a different agenda.F
Up until 1982, BPA had enthusiastically supported the ideas put forward on
the Umatilla River. That year, the Council adopted the Fish and Wildlife Program
with the Umatilla program as a part." But that November, after the formation of its
new Fish and Wildlife Division, BPA balked. First, Bonneville requested that the
habitat study of Northeast Oregon watersheds include the projected numbers of fish
that could be hypothetically produced by each separate habitat improvement over the
entire study area, about fifteen thousand square miles. CTUIR responded that a study
of this size was unreasonable. Beyond the erroneous assumption that these complex
variables could be computed to a formula that could mathematically calculate how
each stream improvement could benefit the whole system, it was also economically
unfeasible: CTUIR had nothing approaching the amount of money necessary to
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conduct such a study. Then, suddenly reversing itself, BPA agreed that the study was
"not worth doing. ,,34 But this exchange highlights two consistent methods the Fish
and Wildlife Division used to avoid dealing with the Umatilla program. First, that
another study was needed. Second, that BPA needed numbers of hypothetical salmon
(benefits) produced by these habitat improvements (costs) to justify Bonneville's
expenditures.
In the spring of 1983, BPA informed the Tribes that the money for the first of
the satellite facilities, Minthorn Springs, would be delayed until October of 1984-
two years after the Council had authorized funding that site. BPA said that the Tribes
had "seriously underestimated costs of fish passage improvements" off the
reservation." This referred to the second crucial piece to the Umatilla Program,
retrofitting the old irrigation projects on the river to include fish passage
improvements for diversion dams and installing screens for irrigation ditches. The
Army Corps of Engineers completed original estimates of these costs in November
1982. At that time, the Tribes warned Bonneville that these estimates were no more
than best guesses; the Council had not granted the Tribes funds to make these
estimates." BPA accepted the Corps estimates knowing they were rough and
incomplete, but months later, BPA used them to delay the funds promised by the
NPPC. At an August 1983 meeting requested by ODFW, BPA expressed its true
concern to the Tribes and ODFW: would the Minthorn Springs facility succeed
without improved stream flows? The Tribes convinced BPA that their biologists had
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a trap and haul plan worked out that would truck juvenile chinooks to the Columbia
in times oflow water. Bonneville appeared satisfied.
Nonetheless, in December after CTUIR had requested a progress report,
Bonneville's Fish and Wildlife Division wrote that it could not fund the construction
of the Minthom Springs Facility because of "the numerous issues" that BPA felt
were unresolved. For Bonneville, these issues meant that
[u]ntil the proposed Minthom Springs facility is completely justified on its
own merits or in terms of its contribution to an achievable overall plan,
BPA will not provide additional design or construction funds. BPA cannot
commit funds to projects that lack adequate technical documentation. To
be acceptable for [BPA] funding, the Umatilla Basin restoration and
protection projects must be consistent with recognized planning and
budgeting processes so that cost-effective decisions can be made in a
rational, timely and justifiable manner."
This letter employs BPA's two chief methods of defending its refusal for funding.
First, that more studies were required (" ... projects that lack adequate technical
documentation ... "). Second, they required that the planning of any project must be
"cost-effective." This became the theme of Bonneville's relationship to the Umatilla
program until 1987.
During 1984, Bonneville continued to delay funding not only the Minthom
Springs facility, but also the Umatilla Steel head Hatchery, another satellite facility
and also a high priority for the Council. Because few steelhead are caught in the
ocean fishery, a greater percentage of these fish come back to be caught by tribal
fishers and non-tribal sport fishermen. This makes them very valuable to both the
Tribes and the sport fishing industry. In order to fund the steelhead hatchery, BPA
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said it needed a comprehensive plan that stated its biological objectives. The Fish
and Wildlife Division required that the study "[e]stimate potential benefits of each of
the rehabilitation and flow enhancement projects.'?" even though it is virtually
impossible to estimate the cumulative benefit to salmon of each individual project.
Ed Chaney, the leading biologist for the Tribes, put it succinctly:
There is no substantive historical data on salmon production in the
drainage; salmon have been absent in meaningful numbers for more than a
half century. The number of hatchery fish ultimately "produced" in the
Umatilla River will be determined by experience, management decisions
and unpredictable political forces. The number of naturally-produced fish
will depend as much on future management decisions as on the
productivity of the habitat. No one will be surprised if a decade or two
hence actual numbers of natural and hatchery-produced fish are 50% of
today's projections. And no amount of ratepayer-financed study could
meaningfully improve on estimates of production potential by tribal, state,
and federal biologists.l"
Chaney's words crystallize one of the most important debates between biologists and
bureaucrats, not just in the Umatilla Basin, but over the entire range of the Northwest
Salmon crisis: the uncertainties of modern ecology versus the absolute needs of
fiscal planners. A natural system like a river basin has innumerable factors that affect
its fauna. Some scientists once thought that it could reduce such an environment to a
series of equations--that would define trophic levels of energy transference, for
example--and discover hard numbers that planners could rely on." Planners could
then use such numbers to see now much money would be required to produce "x"
amount of salmon. But natural systems have proven far more impenetrable than
scientists realized, especially in a system so damaged as the Umatilla River.
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Predicting such "production numbers" with any sort of accuracy is not only
impossible, but also folly, because to predict and miscalculate is to disappoint and
ruin credibility.
Tribal biologists believed that the Umatilla Fish Restoration Program would
restore salmon populations in the Umatilla River Basin. They felt they had enough
scientific evidence to support this position, and the Northwest Power Planning
Council agreed. But the bureaucrats at Bonneville Power Administration wanted
solid numbers of fish to show what it was paying for, that its expenditures were
worth the price. Its preoccupation with what Chaney called "paper fish" shows that
BPA was relying on a kind of cost-benefit analysis. But biologists cannot compute
the program facilities times the stream improvements provide to equal a certain
amount offish. It is exactly these kinds of benefits, in terms of numbers offish
produced, that a project with over-arching biological goals cannot provide.
In 1985 and in spite of the difficulty, ODFW completed the comprehensive
plan that BPA had requested. The Comprehensive Plan for Rehabilitation of
Anadromous Fish Stocks in the Umatilla River Basin specified every aspect ofthe
various projects, with attention to how many paper fish could be produced by every
single satellite facility and every implemented stream-bed improvement, from flow
enhancement to screens for irrigation ditches to passage facilities on the irrigation
darns." BPA promptly informed the Tribes and ODFW that it wanted to request that
the Council amend the Fish and Wildlife Program to include the Umatilla projects.
Amending the Council's Program is a lengthy, arduous proposition. Doggedly,
85
Tribal representatives reminded Bonneville that the Umatilla projects were already
part of the Fish and Wildlife program, that they still had the highest priority of both
the State of Oregon and the Council. BPA responded that there had been enough
changes in the cost of the project to warrant the full amendment process, complete
with input from the public. In addition, the comprehensive plan would have to be
compared to other Columbia Basin fish mitigation efforts to assess the Umatilla's
costs. This became BPA' Fish and Wildlife Division's third method of delaying
funding. By claiming that the cost of the project had increased enough to justify re-
ratification by the Council, BPA stymied CTUIR. To send the entire project back to
the Council for review, because of the public participation and meetings, could easily
ke si h 42ta SIX mont s.
At a meeting on November 21, 1985, BPA repeated its desire that the
measures be sent back to the Council. But it appeared that ODFW and CTUIR had
convinced BPA that the financial hardship on the Tribes was too great. The Tribes
could not afford to participate in the formalizing of the comprehensive plan, nor the
six months it would take to amend the Fish and Wildlife Program. CTUIR also
asserted that continued vacillating amounted to a violation of their treaty rights. BPA
agreed to look at other procedures, such as submitting the comprehensive plan to the
Council as a work plan, rather than a full amendment process, in order to get a
statement of approval. 43
This softening ofBPA's position was temporary. In a letter dated January 7,
1986, the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Division wrote to the Tribes, informing
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them that since the overall costs of the various Umatilla projects were more than five
times more expensive than originally planned, it was, after all, necessary to send
them back to the Council for a full review.44 These so-called cost overruns that BPA
was concerned about were the Army Corps of Engineers' preliminary estimates of
retrofitting the irrigation diversion dams for fish passage. At the time, BPA had said,
"not to worry.':" Suddenly, it became a very large worry.
When ODFW and the Tribes further questioned BPA on this last point, it
became clear BPA was concerned about irrigation ditch screens, but mostly the issue
of adequate instream flows on the river. Simultaneous with the struggle to begin the
Umatilla Fish Restoration Program, the Tribes were also laying the groundwork for
the Umatilla Basin Project, which would bring water back to the river. But even so,
BPA wrote to the chairman of Northwest Power Planning Council that the Umatilla
comprehensive plan must be amended into the Fish and Wildlife Program to insure
"full consideration of the cost effectiveness and prudence of additional
implementation activities in the basin .... BPA's support assumes that the production
benefits attributed to the various enhancement projects ... are accurate and
achievable.,,47
In May, The Council gave its terse response: except for the unresolved water
issues regarding the Umatilla Basin Project with the Bureau of Reclamation and the
irrigation districts, no amendment was necessary. The ODFW comprehensive plan
was merely part of a process that the Council had already accepted in 1982.48BPA
chose to see this response as a de facto amendment to the Fish and Wildlife Program,
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a move it claimed cut the public out of the decision-making process. The Council's
flat denial of BPA's position prompted anger in the Fish and Wildlife Division.
Apparently, the NPPC's rebuff wounded some members within the Division. Adding
a perceived insult to this injury, the Council's decision was written not by a full
Councilman, but by a mere staff member. BPA replied angrily, claiming that
unwillingness of the Council to send the program back to the amendment process
showed a "lack of support" for the Umatilla measures.
A month after this exchange, the BPA project manager for the Umatilla
Program, Thomas Vogel, told Council staff "Bonneville sees the Umatilla 'as an
opportunity, not a commitment,''' and hinted strongly a connection between this
statement and the Council's rejection ofBPA's amendment request." Two things are
remarkable about this exchange. First is Bonneville's injured response to the
Council. The second is the thinly veiled threat against the Umatilla Fish Restoration
Program. By claiming that the Umatilla Program was "an opportunity, not a
commitment," BPA was essentially saying that it was the Bonneville Power
Administration, and not the Northwest Power Planning Council, that had the final
say as to which anadromous fish projects would get funding. This position flies in
the face of the statutory language of the Northwest Power Act. But unaccountably,
the Council never challenged BPA on this point.
Sometime that spring, Vogel released an undated paper that called on the
parties to institute a "measured approach" to the Umatilla situation. Because of "a
shortcoming of planning efforts," the paper said, there was no way to deal with "a
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substantial list of unknowns." To compensate for these "unknowns," the parties
should proceed "only with those projects that will reasonably assure cost effective
benefits." This language made clear that BPA would only advance those parts of the
program that met its own criteria, criteria that Vogel gave away with his use of the
word "benefit" in the same sentence as "cost effective." In effect, he claimed
ultimate control over which measures of the program met his version of the cost-
benefit analysis."
Vogel's statement that there was a paucity of planning efforts ignored the
vast mountain of studies on the river that made the Umatilla what Ed Chaney called
the most studied river in the Columbia Basin51 His implication that BPA was not
legally obligated to fund the Umatilla measures of the Fish and Wildlife Program
seems equally astounding--the Northwest Power Act clearly states that Bonneville
shall fund projects approved by the NPPC. After the publication of "A Measured
Approach," the Council, the Tribes, and ODFW had had enough. They took their
case over the head of Bonneville's Division ofFish and Wildlife to the BPA
administrator, James Jura. In a meeting on August 25,1986, the plan's advocates
made their case to Jura. The Umatilla, they maintained, had been studied more than
any river basin in the Pacific Northwest. They had completed all the production
plans anyone could desire, and outside of the issues involving stream flows, which
they had temporarily solved with a trap-and-haul plan, they were ready to commence
activity. Administrator Jura agreed to take up the issue.
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The Fish and Wildlife Division's resistance to the Umatilla measures shifted
focus from the facilities themselves to the rehabilitation of the river. The habit of the
Division to exaggerate, overstate, and misstate the cost of the hatchery's operations
came to the attention ofa member of the Council, Kai N. Lee, who found it as
disturbing as the Tribes. In a letter to a colleague, Lee wrote:
On my way home from the last Fish 4 meeting, I ran into an acquaintance,
whom I shall not identify right now, who passed along the following
document. ... The paper was described to me as a BPA staff paper prepared
for Administrator Jura's visit to the Umatilla Basin 31 October. The
discussion at page 4 is particularly disturbing. The 6-fold increase in the
cost of habitat improvement and passage restoration activities sounds
worrisome. BPA may be either inaccurate or quoting out of context.Y
BPA's "context" was the cost-benefit analysis. And while most of the paper, entitled
"BPA Concerns with Projects Ongoing or Under Consideration in the Umatilla
Basin," had to do with the upcoming struggle over keeping water in the river, BPA
still continued to hammer at the "increased costs" of the same fish passage
improvements that it had cited in 198553
Ed Chaney was quite used to the "contextual inaccuracies" of BPA. He had
been dealing with it from the start of the program, and in 1986 he became so
frustrated with BPA's endless delays that wrote an article for the Idaho Law
Review54 In that article he castigated BPA's Fish and Wildlife Division for
exercising discretionary authority over the funding of the Umatilla project-
discretionary authority BPA did not have 55 Chaney acidly itemized the Division's
misinformation and mistakes in a page for page and item by item detailing of how
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Bonneville had used the "power of the purse to establish its own shadow fish and
wildlife program.?" He characterized BPA's "dissembling" ofinfonnation as
"mean-spiritedness," and as a willful attempt to take control ofthe Umatilla Fish
Restoration Program." In the essay, Chaney exhaustively chronicled BPA's
resistance, stating that the Fish and Wildlife Division's goal was to co-opt the
Council's role and to set up "a shadow fish and wildlife program" that would
essentially establish BPA as the "final arbiter" of projects approved by the NPPC.58
After BPA's administrator visited the Umatilla in October of 1986, he agreed
with the Tribes and committed BPA funds long held from the program. Jura
committed more than just funds. He also committed energy. He replaced BPA
Project Manager Thomas Vogel, who, according to Ed Chaney, "for years had
stonewalled, dissembled, impugned, threatened, and otherwise attempted to frustrate
state-tribal chinook restoration," with Tom Clune. Clune immediately contacted the
Tribes and ODFW to develop "an implementation schedule based upon state-tribal
priorities." Clune was "responsive to [the Tribes'] need for quick action on critical
measures" with the Program.i" All parties involved came to an agreement on
November 6.60
The direct evidence shows that BPA resisted strenuously funding the
Umatilla Fish Restoration Program. Why they resisted is less clear, but
circumstances point to two possible reasons. The first is that Bonneville simply did
not want to spend the money. In Bonneville's defense, it saw a desiccated river
where salmon had not been able to survive for more than 70 years. The Tribes
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wanted to spend millions of ratepayer dollars in a river where there was little water,
where the conditions that had originally killed off salmon still existed. The lower
thirty-two miles of the Umatilla was totally inhospitable to fish in the driest season,
exactly when salmon would be migrating. In 1986, when BPA published "A
Measured Approach," there was no tangible evidence that there would ever be
enough water. Itmade no sense to spend millions of dollars to make salmon extinct
agam.
A second possibility is that Bonneville wanted control over the entire
Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program. Bonneville had been in joint
control with the Army Corps of Engineers of the operation of the hydropower system
for many, many years, and the Northwest Power Act threatened that control by
making a biological entity equal with the industrial hydroelectric system. Since BPA
would end up paying for any projects the Council recommended, it wanted the last
word on any river management decisions--including those dealing with fish. If the
Power Act meant that biologists would have a say in how the Columbia was run,
then BPA would maintain control ofthe hydropower system by making sure that
most of those biologists worked for Bonneville's Fish and Wildlife Division. Clearly,
though, some element within BPA wanted to stall or kill the Umatilla program.
The language that BPA used in its Fish and Wildlife Division's memos and
correspondence with the Tribes, the Council, and ODFW use the new lexicon of the
Columbia. But on a close reading, it is clear that there is other language imbedded in
the communication that conveys a much different idea. BPA revealed in its choice of
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words its lack of confidence in the Umatilla program. To stall or kill it, it would go
so far as to try and take control of it. What remains unclear is whether BPA actually
conducted a cost-benefit analysis that showed the Umatilla program would not pay
for itself, and decided then to take over the program and kill it, or that it simply
decided it was not going to fund the project and tried to justify itself by saying that
the project was not cost effective. The Tribes' theory of putting salmon in the still-
dry river failed to convince BPA of the project's worthiness---that much is certain.
Whether the managers in BPA's Fish and Wildlife Division understood that
cost-benefit analysis was an obsolete tool in fish mitigation and mindfully dressed it
in the words cost effective, or simply did not understand that the terms are
fundamentally different, is really immaterial. Both possibilities show an ossified
approach to fish management. BPA had great difficulty adapting to both the
Council's new definition of mitigation (to include projects "off-site") and a lack of
control over where its funds went. The fact is, if these new mitigation projects like
the Umatilla Program seemed expensive, then that suggests strongly that the original
cost-benefit analysis of the dams that excluded the biological value of salmon as part
of its calculation, was flawed.
The Fish and Wildlife Division's effort to claim discretionary authority over
Council-allocated funds was essentially an attempted palace coup d'etat. There is
absolutely no statutory authority for that agency to co-opt the Council's power as
specified in the Northwest Power Act. Bonneville's Fish and Wildlife Division was
unsatisfied with its role and sought to attempt to circumnavigate the Council, and
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retain control over what it considered to be its money. Ultimately, the coup failed.
But the consequence of the Council's silence and not making a legal challenge to
BPA's position, is that BPA maintains its Fish and Wildlife Division as an advisory
agent in salmon management, an agency with motives that are not based on biology.
INSTITUTIONS, LIKE PEOPLE, SPEAK CERTAIN LANGUAGES. They have
distinct personalities. After years of speaking a given tongue, performing a given
task, an institution becomes accustomed to that task and its language and changes
little unless forced. Change in a bureaucratic institution is painfully slow, since the
people within it, accustomed to performing a particular job, have little or no
incentive to change. Such was the situation BPA found itself in after 1980. Having
run the Federal Columbia River Power System for forty years under the directive of
rationality and the maximum efficiency of every drop of water, it was now in the
situation of, as the fictitious Army Corps of Engineers colonel allegedly put it,
"playing nursemaid to fish.,,61The Northwest Power Act was took the decision-
making process out ofBPA's hands, and mandated that BPA simply write checks.
But the record shows that BPA did not intend to simply write the checks. It tried to
control the process outright by appropriating control over funds. Only when ODFW
and the Tribes went over BPA's Fish and Wildlife Division's head to the
Administrator was the funding forthcoming. The goal of Bonneville's fish division
appeared to be to bring the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program under
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its control by using the "power of the purse" to choose what projects got funding and
what did not. On its face, the establishment of a fish and wildlife division seems a
step in the direction of ecological responsibility, until one realizes that Bonneville
has no need for a fish and wildlife division at all. BPA's charge is to fund fish
mitigation projects approved by the Council. What could a new division add to the
body of knowledge provided by state, federal, and tribal biologists?
It is possible that the Division was divided on the issue between a "pro-
Umatilla" faction and an "anti-Umatilla" faction. One thing is sure: to the extent that
there were anti-Umatilla sentiments in the Division, John Palensky, head of the Fish
and Wildlife Division, and Tom Vogel, BPA's Umatilla Project Manager, were
major factors. It was Palensky's name attached to most of above documentation
where cost-benefit analysis is confused with cost effectiveness. And the record is
clear that it was Vogel who contributed to most of the delaying tactics that the
Division engaged in.
But even after the costly delays, the Tribes, with the help ofODFW, built the
Umatilla facilities, they did work, and they bred salmon and steelhead for release.
The project was not perfect: the fish were being trapped and hauled the last thirty
miles past the dried-out river, but the Umatilla Basin Act had not yet been passed by
Congress. New water for fish was in the works. But nothing is simple. Although
irrigators had drained the Umatilla, no one was requiring that they scale down their
appropriations. A new conflict over old systems was brewing.
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CHAPTER IV-RE-WATERING THE UMATILLA: THE UMATILLA BASIN PROJECT
Ifthere's any salmon in that river, they'd need dirt bikes to get upstream.
-Tom Simmons'
"RAIN FOLLOWS THE PLOW" IS AS OLD A PLATITUDE AS ANY in the
American West.2 In the struggle over the Umatilla fishery program, the Confederated
Tribes could have coined their own variation of this expression: "water follows the
fish." In 1982, the Tribes threw thousands of chinook smolts into the Umatilla,
deliberately pressuring the status quo of salmon management. This kind of renegade
fish management had the desired effect: the Tribes got their program off the ground.
But reintegrating salmon into the Umatilla meant reintroducing water to the river as
well. All parties recognized that without improved instream flows on the river, the
whole point of the hatchery would be moot: salmon could not get up a Umatilla
River that did not flow into the Columbia. Irrigation in the dry months claimed
virtually every drop from the river.
At the same time that the fisheries restoration program was struggling
through BPA's obstructions, another drama was unfolding over a more basic
resource. Since a generous supply of cold water was absolutely necessary for
reintegrating fish, the players that had controlled the flow of the Umatilla River for
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many, many years were about to be challenged. This challenge would have
repercussions throughout the Umatilla Basin, and the entire Columbia River Basin.
The drama of getting water to the Umatilla revolved around a complex set of
players. The instigators of the movement were the Confederated Tribes of the
Umatilla Indian Reservation. With environmental resource consultant Ed Chaney
taking the lead, as he had in the fisheries restoration program, the Tribes began an
active search for water and allies to get it. The Tribes competed with the four
irrigation districts of the area: the Stanfield Irrigation District, the Westland
Irrigation District, the West Extension Irrigation District, and the Hermiston
Irrigation District. These districts had been diverting water for over 70 years. The
Tribes needed a strategy for dealing with this entrenched power.
These four districts worked to develop an extensive series of canals, ditches,
reservoirs, and diversion dams in the lower Umatilla Basin. Stanfield Irrigation
District diverted water from above the town of Echo, more than twenty miles up the
river from its mouth. The Hermiston Irrigation District relied on diversion dams on
the mainstem Umatilla and on water from a reservoir on Cold Springs Creek, a
tributary of the Umatilla, to irrigate a vast area east of the river. The Westland
Irrigation District irrigated another large area on the west bank ofthe river where the
Umatilla turned north on its final reach. The West Extension Irrigation District
withdrew water from behind Threemile Dam and pumped it to a canal that ran
parallel to the Columbia River down to fields around Irrigon and all the way to
Boardman, far outside the Umatilla Basin.'
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The plan that all willing parties came up with would have to be built by the
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. In the 1920s, the Bureau built the original Umatilla
Basin Project in accordance with the Newlands Act. Sixty years later, the Tribes
petitioned the federal government to allow the Bureau to construct another Umatilla
Basin Project. This time, it would be a water project to help salmon rather than
irrigators.
As with the Umatilla Fish Restoration Program, the Bonneville Power
Administration was involved in the water issue, for the Northwest Power Planning
Council required BPA to put some money into the Tribes' re-watering design.
Bonneville, however, did not want to fund water projects, and resisted any
responsibility for any money not directly related to fish and wildlife improvements.
Fostering this resistance was one ofBPA's biggest customers, the Pacific Northwest
Utilities Conference Committee, an umbrella organization for the Direct Service
Industries (DSIs). DSIs purchased power wholesale from BPA. PNUCC clearly saw
that any BPA funds spent on anything outside ofrepaying BPA debts to the federal
government as a potential cost to "ratepayers," namely themselves.
The role of environmentalist in this drama is fulfilled by a group based on the
west side of the Cascades in Hillsboro that is dedicated to protecting the waterways
of the state. WaterWatch of Oregon opposed the Umatilla Basin Project as nothing
more than another scheme for irrigators to plunder the scarce resources of the West.
WaterWatch threatened litigation, which endangered the Project because Congress
often refused to fund projects facing legal challenges.
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The first step belonged to the Confederated Tribes. To recover the river's
water, the Tribes had two options. First, they could reassert their original water rights
and take the irrigation districts to court. Because of the U.S. Supreme Court's
Winters, the Tribes probably had enough legal precedent to claim their implied water
rights to the Umatilla and thereby force the irrigation districts to leave enough water
in the river to support a fishery." The second possibility was that the Tribes could
appeal to the federal government through the Bureau of Reclamation to approve a
new water project in the basin. After all, many reasoned, the Bureau's water projects
during the 1920s had caused the problem, so they ought to solve it. Regardless of
how they approached the problem, the Tribes needed allies, for whenever water is
reallocated in the arid West opponents rise up like the wind on the Columbia Plateau.
The Winters Doctrine
The Confederated Tribes considered a direct legal challenge to water
distribution on the Umatilla River by reclaiming their reserved, implied water rights.'
The concept of implied water rights comes from a 1907 Supreme Court decision
(virtually the same Court that decided the Winans case) in Winters v. United States.
The Court ruled that in signing treaties with the federal government Indian Tribes
had reserved more than land and other explicit rights (like fishing). The Court held
that Native peoples had not given up water rights in the treaties, and not even the
admission into the union of a state within whose borders the reservation existed
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could defer or destroy those rights." The ability of an Indian tribe to evoke those
implied water rights became known as the "Winters Doctrine."7 Unlike the doctrine
of prior appropriation, tribal water rights were never revoked for nonuse.
Theoretically, all the Umatilla Tribes had to do was to assert their neglected water
rights under Winters, and then watch the fish swim home.
But this is a simplified version of western water law. Indian water rights have
undergone changes in lower court decisions, and through a federal law that modified
Winters in by changing the adjudication of Indian water rights. The power of Indian
tribes to appropriate water is not what it was or could have been.
Two issues in Indian water rights are most important. First, water rights are
creatures of the states. In the humid East, the riparian doctrine was relied upon by
river dwellers for many years. But in the arid West, the law of prior appropriations
ruled the day. This doctrine is exemplified in the phrase "first in time, first in right,"
which means that rights are conferred in chronological order for those claiming
water from a river. A farmer settling late in an area and claiming a water right might
get a water right yet no water, if those ahead of him "in time" used it all. Because
many treaties recognized the Indians as residents of the land "from time
immemorial" and many of those reservations were established on part of the
traditional lands, the Indian water rights were "prior" to any Euro-American
irrigator. Further, "implied" rights meant that those rights reserved by the Tribes,
which included rights on the lands ceded by treaty. This put the states at odds with
Indian tribes and the federal government, because the a state could not regulate water
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within its own boundaries that the federal government claimed, and all Indian water
rights were considered federal water rights. States were unable to challenge the
United States government because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Sovereign
immunity decrees that the federal government cannot be sued in state court against
its will. When a state did manage to bring suit against the federal government over
Indian water rights the suit was always heard in federal court, which nearly always
ruled in favor ofthe Indians.
The Tribes' need to get water cases into federal and not state courts is
illustrated in a 1917 Oregon Supreme Court case, Byers v. Wa-Wa-Ne. This is the
pivotal case in the minds of tribal lawyers when they consider a Winters-style
challenge to existing water allocations. The Byers case demonstrated the insecurity
the Tribes feel toward their water rights. Although the case is an extremely narrow
and highly flawed interpretation, the Umatilla Indians consider this case the
"Achilles' heel" of Winters.8
The Byers case arose from a challenge by a tribal member to the water rights
of a Euro-Arnerican woman who diverted a flow of Umatilla water to run her
flourrnill in Pendleton. Oregon Supreme Court Judge McCamant wrote that, because
the Severalty Act of 1887 (also known as the Dawes Act) opened "surplus"
reservation lands to settlement, Mrs. Byers held a legitimate water right. The U.S.
Attorney presenting the case for the Tribes argued that the Tribes had an older,
implied right under the Winters Doctrine. Judge McCamant rejected that argument,
and ruled that the Winters Doctrine did not apply in this case. In the case of Winters,
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wrote Judge McCamant, the Indians had actually been irrigating the land and the
Supreme Court stated that the Fort Belknap Reservation lands in Montana were
useless without irrigation water. The situation on the Umatilla River and the 1855
Treaty between the Umatilla, Walla Walla, and Cayuse and the United States was
different. Seizing on this point, the Oregon Supreme Court argued that "The [Fort
Belknap] treaty evidenced an intention that the Indians should farm the lands on the
reservation and they could not be farmed without irrigation. ,,9
These authorities do not hold, as we read them, that the mere creation of
an Indian reservation by treaty impliedly secures to the Indians all water in
streams which touch the reservation which they may at any time desire to
put to a useful purpose. The Indians were given arid lands which could not
be farmed without irrigation; it was the purpose of the government to
induce them to farm, a purpose manifest on the face of the treaties."
It was only under those conditions, according to Judge McCamant, that the U.S.
Supreme Court "found in the treaties an implied grant of the water rights in
. ,,11question.
In other words, the Fort Belknap was fundamentally different from the
Umatilla Reservation because the shape of the river valley made irrigation on the
reservation uplands too expensive, therefore the Tribes were not entitled to water
rights. Also, "witnesses" testified in the case that most of the Umatilla bottomland
was "generally speaking ... rocky and gravelly," and therefore ill-suited for irrigated
farming. Irrigated agriculture was never intended for the reservation land on the
Umatilla above Pendleton. Since the Treaty of 1855 "was silent" on the subject of
water, the court ruled that no such right existed.
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This narrow interpretation of the Winters Doctrine in 1917 by the Oregon
State Supreme Court seems rickety beyond belief today, considering the fact that
agriculture has spread all over the lower reservation lands.
The Tribes could have challenged the Byers decision. They chose not to. The
key to an excellent chance at winning such a challenge would have a lot to do with
the venue in which the suit was heard. A federal court would probably be more
sympathetic than a state court, but Congress passed a law in 1952 that relinquished
federal supremacy over federal water rights, including Indian water rights.
That law was the McCarran Amendment." With this law, the federal
government waived its privilege of sovereign immunity in regard to water rights
issues. In other words, a state could now compel the federal government to appear in
a state court to adjudicate water rights. In 1983, the Supreme Court strengthened the
scope of this law when it ruled in Arizona v. San Juan Apache Tribe that the
McCarran Amendment gave the states the power to adjudicate tribal water rights
even if that state's constitution ruled that it did not have that power. 13 This removed
Indian water rights from a venue where Native Americans had enjoyed support of
their rights-the federal courts-to a venue traditionally hostile to their
interests-the state courts. Judges in Oregon state courts were unlikely to rule in
favor of the Tribes if the Tribes invoked the Winters Doctrine and thereby laid claim
to the entire watershed of the Umatilla Basin. A state court might be much more
unlikely to overturn a state supreme court decision like Byers. The State of Oregon
might cooperate with the Umatilla Tribes by sharing biological expertise in a project
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to revive fish runs, as ODFW did with the Umatilla Fish Restoration Program, but
this was very different than allowing the Umatillas to invoke the Winters Doctrine.
A Winters Doctrine unrevised by the McCarran Amendment has awesome
implications. In the Umatilla Basin, invoking the Winters Doctrine would mean
transferring water rights from farms long accustomed to withdrawing water for their
crops to the Confederated Tribes. It would then be the choice of the Tribes whether
to grant appropriations of water to farmers and irrigation districts. If the Tribes chose
to keep water in the river for the fish, that could cripple the local agricultural
economy, an economy worth between eight and 50 million dollars annually. 14 The
Umatilla Indians also had fishing rights on other rivers in the ceded area where
irrigation had hurt salmon runs: the Walla Walla, the Imnaha, and the Grande Ronde.
Because the Winters Doctrine applied in theory to ceded lands (because Indians gave
up rights and title to land but not rights to water), the Tribes could use the Winters
Doctrine in all of the river basins in their traditional lands. They theoretically could
become the water masters of northeastern Oregon and reclaim that water in the name
of salmon.
Other tribes had seen their traditional game dwindle because of irrigation
projects in the West. The Northern Paiute, for example, who had watched irrigation
projects western Nevada obliterate the Lahontan cutthroat trout, fish that weighed up
to fifty-pounds, and had migrated between Lake Tahoe and land-locked Pyramid
Lake for generations. IS The Klamath Indians of Southern Oregon have fought to
protect the sacred short-nosed sucker from irrigation diversions in the Klamath River
104
Basin.16 Irrigation on literally thousands of square miles all over the West has
inflicted losses on the habitat of wildlife used by native people. If other tribes could
successfully invoke the Winters Doctrine it could begin a revolution of mammoth
proportions in the way resources are allocated in the American West.
The McCarran Amendment was a radical revision of the Winters Doctrine.
Allowing the states, entities traditionally hostile to tribal peoples, to adjudicate tribal
water rights, swung the pendulum far from the federal and tribal position. Since
1952, the tribes have lost many water law cases that before the 1950s were upheld all
the way to the highest court. The legal ground of Indian water rights was far too
unstable for the Confederated Tribes to risk a definitive decision that could backfire
and curtail or abrogate of their treaty rights. For the Confederated Tribes to bring the
state to court over water rights implied in Winters v. United States meant risking
those rights in state court and losing. If the U.S. Supreme Court upheld such a
decision, they could be lost forever.
A more recent development shows that states are also uncomfortable with the
ramifications of the Winters Doctrine, despite their power to adjudicate tribal water
rights. In 1998, the State of Oregon found the shifting ground of tribal water law a
serious enough threat to the control of its natural resources that it entered into a
compact with the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Indian Reservation. The
state and irrigators of the Deschutes River nominally recognized the sovereignty of
the Warm Springs over allocation of water flowing east out of the Cascades into the
middle Deschutes River under the condition that the Warm Springs guarantee local
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irrigators specified amount of water. This agreement was the culmination of years of
negotiation between the state and the Warm Springs Tribes. It recognized the
potential havoc on Oregon water rights the Tribes could wreak if they invoked
Winters Doctrine. The agreement assures the local irrigators water, but puts the
Tribes in charge of that water. 17
However, that agreement took place sixteen years after the Umatilla Basin
Project was proposed in 1982. The legal flux of tribal water rights was such that the
Confederated Tribes felt it unwise to challenge irrigation interests head-on. With no
guarantee that they would win they could easily lose more than just a case, but also
have their water rights defined in such a way as to render those rights impotent. Also,
litigation takes time. Don Sampson of the Umatilla Tribes has pointed out that the
Yakama Indians have filed a suit based on Winters against the Sunnyside Irrigation
District for the Tribe's water rights in order to provide better instream flows for their
salmon supplementation plan. That suit is still in litigation. To this day the Yakima
River has "not a single drop more water than when [the Yakama] started" the suit. 18
Bringing suit in the state court seemed too risky to initiate.
Second, the Confederated Tribes had no wish to see the farming economy of
Umatilla County destroyed. They recognized that today's irrigators in the Umatilla
Basin "did not create the problem, they inherited it."19The Confederated Tribes did
no intend to alter the face of water allocation policies in the American West. If they
lost, an important weapon would be gone. In many cases, the threat of a thing is
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more potent than carrying out the threat. Itmade more sense to keep a potential
Winters Doctrine suit in reserve as a just such a threat.
Therefore, the Tribes chose another option. They elected to go outside the
region and solicit the federal government for a project that would solve the Umatilla
Basin's water problems. This method is consistent with the history of development in
the American West, development that depended on the capital and expertise of the
U.S. Government.i'' In this case the Tribes needed to convince the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation to undertake studies and develop a project that the U.S. Congress would
approve and fund. By 1982, CTUIR had voiced its opinion to the Bureau:
A BurRec instream flow enhancement project is essential to restore the
salmon and steelhead productivity of the Umatilla River Basin and to
protect Indian rights to fish reserved by treaty with the U.S. Government
in exchange for cedeing [sic] vast areas ofland including the entire 2300
square mile Umatilla River drainage."
To convince Washington, D.C. to spend the money would require allies. The Tribes
went into negotiations with the irrigation districts with the carrot of status quo water
allocations for all who had water rights. They explicitly cited the Treaties of 1855 as
their primary weapon, but all involved seemed to understand that the fishing rights
were connected implicitly to the big stick of the Winters Doctrine.
JOt
Allies
In 1982 the Bureau of Reclamation began an in-stream flow study of the
Umatilla at the request of the Council and the Tribes. This study outlined "alternative
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means of increasing Umatilla River streamflows for salmon and steelhead
production ... without adversely impacting present irrigation uses." But a study did
not mean a project. The Tribes needed support from other interests in the Umatilla
Basin, and so they approached irrigation districts and businesses. Many business
leaders in the Pendleton area were also managers of irrigation districts. The region's
economy was tied to irrigated farming and it made sense to get the other economic
interests into the lobbying effort.r'
To this end, Ed Chaney met with the heads of the major irrigation districts at
the Stanfield fire station on October 26, 1982, to spell out the Tribes' need for water.
These initial negotiations hinged on a single tribal goal: the Tribes would bring back
their salmon at almost any cost. Chaney's presentation cited the "Tribes' treaty right
to fish." The Tribes, he told the irrigators, wanted to accomplish salmon restoration
with as little disturbance to the economic order as possible. But, if necessary, they
would exert all the legal and political muscle they had. Their right to salmon in the
Umatilla Basin was not up for discussion. Chaney pointed out that the Tribes had
made numerous concessions over the years, even in planning the Umatilla Fish
Restoration Program in particular. For example, Chaney told Hadley Akins, the
manager at the U.S. National Bank in Pendleton, that the Tribes had gone so far as to
select a stock of fall chinook that spawned later than most and thereby interfere the
least with the irrigators' busiest water season." The irrigators nominally agreed with
Chaney and the Tribes' position. The irrigators understood too well that the Tribes,
armed with both the Boldt decision and the Winters Doctrine, had the higher legal
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ground, and that ifpush came to shove (and litigation) the irrigators stood to lose all.
They realized that the Tribes had the potential to destroy their industry, and
accordingly agreed to help back the Umatilla Basin Project." Both sides risked all in
litigation, and so both sides chose to ally instead.
This preliminary agreement between the Tribes and irrigators did not
transform the area's water problems. In the Summer of 1983, there was a small
incident that exemplified the continuing problems of water appropriation in the basin
and also foreshadowed future conflict. The Oregon Water Resources Department
(OWRD) responded to three new claims on the Umatilla by issuing water permits to
Don Brown, Chester Prior, and Ivon J. Cook to draw water from the Umatilla. The
Tribes protested. The Umatilla was already overdrawn. Just as the Tribes were
forging a working relationship with irrigators of the area, the State was continuing to
over-appropriate the river. This incident shows how State agencies worked at cross-
purposes on the Umatilla. ODFW was working with the Tribes to plan and construct
the Umatilla Fish Restoration Program to bring back salmon to the river, while at the
same time, OWRD was giving away river water that the fish used. To the Tribes, this
"promised the river twice," no different than what the federal government had done
back in the heyday of irrigation projects in the basin in the 1920s. Then, the
government promised the Umatilla's waters first to the Umatilla Tribes through
treaty by guaranteeing fishing rights at "all usual and accustomed places," then
promised it to irrigators through the construction of the original Umatilla Basin
Project in the 1910s and 1920s. The treaty did not guarantee water per se, but it
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implied that, since the Umatilla River was a usual and accustomed place and there
needed to be a river for the salmon to survive. In 1983, the Tribes' complaint against
further appropriations was more of an irritant than a stumbling block to progress, but
this issue was not dead; it would come back with a vengeance seven years later when
environmentalists criticized over-appropriation."
In 1983, the Bureau of Reclamation completed its instream flow study, paid
for by BPA. BPA paid for the study, as it did many other studies throughout the
Columbia Basin, because it would demonstrate the water resources available to
salmon, in this case salmon produced from the Umatilla Program. In July, the
Bureau told representatives of the Tribes and the irrigators that it was seeking a
waiver of the required cost-benefit analysis on the project from the Department of
the Interior. This was a refreshing change for the Tribes: a major federal bureaucracy
understood that the biological goal of a particular project could not be measured
monetarily. The Bureau correctly understood that the benefits of the project could
not be tabulated, and had no wish to try. 26
The Bureau outlined two possibilities for a water project. First, the Bureau
could provide the irrigators with Columbia River water. To do this the Bureau would
construct a series of canals and huge pumps to draw water from behind McNary
Dam into the interior of the Umatilla Basin. Irrigators would then leave the cleaner,
colder Umatilla for salmon habitat. In other words, the project would exchange
Columbia River water with irrigators for Umatilla River water. It was important to
actually exchange water, not just refill the Umatilla with Columbia water, since
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salmon would have a difficult time both imprinting on the Umatilla as juveniles and
navigating home as adults if they were smelling water from the wrong river. The
second possibility was that the Bureau could build a reservoir upstream, and the
Tribes could use this lake to keep water in the Umatilla at times crucial to salmon.
The favored site was Bear Creek, a side canyon of the North Fork of Meacham
Creek. Meacham Creek is a tributary that flows south-to-north out of the Blue
Mountains into the Umatilla on the reservation. Its steep walls are ideal for a dam to
insure adequate instream flows for salmon and steelhead. This seemed a reasonable
solution because there were already a number of man-made lakes in the basin whose
water was contracted by the irrigation districts.
In 1984, based on their determination to provide water for their salmon
restoration project, the Tribes succeeded in gathering the four big Umatilla irrigators
and local businesses into a partnership. The goal of this alliance was to convince
Congress to appropriate money for a substantial water project. The principal
appropriators of the Umatilla River were the Standfield Irrigation District, the
Westland Irrigation District, the West Extension Irrigation District, and the
Hermiston Irrigation District. This coalition called itself the Umatilla Basin Project
Steering Committee. It selected local businessman Hadley Akins as its chairman.
Even though they understood the Tribes' legal capability and resolve, a
summary of the July II meeting shows that the four irrigation districts were still
wary of change, and underscores the fragility of this new alliance. In April 1984, as
part of the irrigation districts input into the nascent Umatilla Basin Project, the
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districts had sent a list of their desires for this new project to the Bureau. Among
their requests was one for new sources of irrigation water. When the Bureau of
Reclamation responded that its project was not intended to provide more water to
irrigators, many irrigation leaders stated that there would be little support for the
Project from the districts. Bill Porfily, the manager of the Westland Irrigation
District, made it clear that "the irrigation districts want to get something more from
the project than a guarantee of the status quo. If they get no further benefit from the
project then the districts might as well allow the tribal litigation to run its course." In
the past, the Bureau's irrigation projects always meant more water for farming. This
time, the Project was intended to bring more water into the basin, but just enough to
meet irrigators' current withdrawals. Porfily opportunistically tried to secure even
more water for the irrigation districts in exchange for supporting the Tribes' plan. If
the Bureau could not promise something extra for the Umatilla irrigators, they would
see just how far the Tribes would really go in the courts. By suggesting that the
irrigation districts would "allow the tribal litigation to run its course," he was
threatening to not support the Project. This attitude is an interesting example of how
some irrigators in the Columbia Basin had come to see Bureau of Reclamation
projects. They considered it a matter of course that they would get more water, not
less, or even the same."
Porfily's threat to refuse support for the Project, which could have hurt its
chances with Congress, turned out to be a bluff. Because the Umatilla Basin Project
proposed to operate with virtually the same appropriation framework as before,
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within the status quo of river operations, irrigators would not be required to change
the way they fanned. They stood to lose nothing. Irrigators knew that any tribal
litigation over water would throw the system into chaos, with dire results if the
irrigators lost. Because nobody minds seeing large amounts of federal money come
into their county, the irrigators joined a large cross-section of the basin's businesses
and the Tribes and entered into the Umatilla Basin Project Steering Committee
compact. These groups worked together to show unified support in the Umatilla
Basin and lobby for the Project with Congress. 28
In March of 1985 the Bureau issued a status report on the Umatilla Basin
Project. For the first time, here was a completed rough draft of the "Recommended
Plan" to exchange water with the four irrigation districts. This draft of the plan had
two "phases." The first was a plan to build a pumping station behind McNary Dam
that would draw water out of the Columbia and into a canal. This canal would then
lead to the Cold Springs Reservoir, where the Stanfield and Hermiston Irrigation
Districts could then draw water. Stanfield would exchange its rights to 20,000 acre
feet of water from McKay Reservoir south of Pendleton for the same amount of
Columbia water. It would then only withdraw about 17,000 acre-feet from the
Umatilla at the Stanfield Diversion Dam. The Hermiston Irrigation District would
draw 13,000 acre-feet from the Columbia-Cold Springs water, although it would still
be withdrawing over 56,000 acre-feet from the Umatilla at Cold Springs Diversion
Dam. The West Extension Irrigation District would rely on a modified Bureau of
Reclamation pump at the mouth of the Umatilla to replace water it withdrew from
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behind Threemile Dam. Exchanging this appropriation as soon as possible for the
soon-to-be-retuming chinook was crucial. Itwas WElD's withdrawals from behind
Threemile Dam had desiccated last three miles of the Umatilla, leaving it dry in the
fall, when fall chinook were coming home. IfWEID could draw Columbia River
water and leave Umatilla water alone, then salmon would be able to get to the new
fish ladders and traps at Threemile Dam. The Bureau estimated the cost of this first
phase at $37 million.29
In the second phase, the Bureau of Reclamation planned to build a new
reservoir on Bear Creek, a tributary of Meacham Creek, far upstream on the
reservation. The Bureau intended water from this new reservoir to replace the
Westland Irrigation District's 3,600 acre-feet appropriation from McKay. The
Bureau estimated this phase at over $78 million. The draft also included fish passage
improvements and screens on irrigation ditches. Finally, the plan stipulated that BPA
would pay the electrical costs of pumping the water.i"
Seven months later, the Bureau of Reclamation presented a revised
"Summary" of the Project. In this revision, the Bureau informed the Tribes that any
new dam on the headwaters of the Meacham Creek was not feasible. At a combined
$188 million for both pumping plan and reservoir, the project was too expensive.
Therefore, the revised summary recommended just the elaborate pumping plan
which would cost an estimated $40 million. (The final cost was over $46 million.) In
addition to cost, the Bureau hinted that there was little support in Congress for
projects that included new dams. By the 1980s, the time of dam building was past.' I
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One crucial element to the plan-and the element to prove the most
controversial-was the significant cost of electricity required by the huge pumps that
would draw water out of the McNary pool. The Bureau's Project plan identified BPA
as the most logical source of power, since it controlled the hydroelectric power of the
Columbia system. For their part, the Tribes saw the Umatilla Basin Project as
interdependent with the Umatilla Fish Restoration Program, and be consistent with
the Northwest Power Act BPA was the most appropriate agency for the pumping
power. If BPA supplied the electricity for the Columbia River pumps, then the
pumping costs would not be figured into the overall costs of the project, thus leaving
more money for sorely needed stream improvements on the river.J2
In 1986, as soon as it became evident that there was enough support for the
Project to involve Oregon lawmakers, the Steering Committee and the NPPC began
to lobby Senator Mark Hatfield and Representative Les AuCoin. Both were members
of their respective chamber's appropriations committees. Senator Hatfield had been
sympathetic to the Umatillas for many years, and saw this as an opportunity to make
good on a more than century-old promise: that there would be fish in the rivers for
time immemorial. He agreed with Councilman Don Godard that the Umatilla Basin
Project was more than the Council could handle and any water project on the scale
being discussed would need federal funds. It seemed that this unlikely coalition of
farmers and Indians were on the verge of completing their unprecedented agreement:
to revive a river without traditional animosities getting in the way."
liS
Power
The traditional rivalry of Indian and irrigator might have reached a tenuous
truce, but other river users had different vested interests. For the Bonneville Power
Administration and its constituents, for example, water was not the issue, but power.
Locally, the Umatilla Basin Project would be trumpeted as "right for the
environment" and "morally essential.":" But regionally, aspects of the Project came
under attack. As soon as it became clear that the Project included this power-
providing role for BPA, both Bonneville and the Pacific Northwest Utilities
Conference Committee (PNUCC) began to resist the plan. In 1986, as the Umatilla
Basin Project Steering Committee prepared to approach the powerful appropriations
committees in both houses of Congress, BPA and PNUCC attacked the project. 35
Because of the lack of available sources, there is a gap in the documentation
at this point, but it is clear that Bonneville discouraged the idea of the Project. In
May, Hadley Akins, the Steering Committee's chair, blasted BPA's Assistant Power
Manager's "completely negative attitude" toward the project that ignored years of
patient negotiating and compromise by the local participants. The Project's
"adversaries," he wrote, were not local, nor national, but regional---the Bonneville
Power Administration.
In June, BPA's Assistant Power Manager, Janet McLennan, wrote to the
Bureau of Reclamation. McLennan unequivocally rejected any role for BPA in the
pumping Project. The Project was not part of the Council's Fish and Wildlife
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Program, so providing power was fundamentally outside its responsibilities under the
Northwest Power Act. IfBPA supplied the electricity for the pumps, it would require
an amendment to the Council's Fish and Wildlife Program, a lengthy proposition.
Any other appropriation of Bonneville funds would have to come from Congress,
which "might delineate BPA's role, if any," in any further fish and wildlife projects.
Before BPA would consider getting involved in the Project, it would have to
"compare the cost of providing fishery benefits ... with the cost of funding other off-
site mitigation projects in the region." In other words, BPA would not have anything
to do with the Project unless that involvement relieved it of its responsibilities in the
Umatilla Basin. McLennan formally requested that the Bureau not include BPA as a
"cooperating agency" in the Project Planning Report. It added that BPA had an
interest in the basin's fish enhancement program."
This tactic is strikingly similar to that used by Bonneville against the
Umatilla Fish Restoration Program. Whenever it got the chance, BPA slowed the
progress of the Tribes' program by demanding that the fish and wildlife program be
amended to include whatever "new" item BPA disagreed with. In the case of the
Umatilla Basin Project, Bonneville had better legal justification, since it saw funding
the power for the Project as a violation of the "in lieu" clause of the Northwest
Power Act (described below). This justification allowed BPA to simply reject
outright the role identified by the Bureau and the Tribes, rather than merely stall as
with the fish restoration program.
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The Tribes were not going to wait until Congress voted on a water project for
the Umatilla. They knew that the chinook that they had released back in 1982 would
be coming back soon, and those fish needed water in the interim between the time
that Congress debated and decided fund the Umatilla Basin Project. For this interim
water, funds would have to come from the Council. The Bureau of Reclamation
recommended retrofitting existing pumps, ditches, and canals to exchange some
water with West Extension Irrigation District for re-watering the lower three miles of
the Umatilla. Since this water was crucial to the fish that the restoration program had
introduced, it made sense that it should be paid for by Bonneville. Therefore, the
Tribes introduced an amendment to the Fish and Wildlife Program for power to
pump interim water as they waited for a federal water project. J7
In 1987, Senator Hatfield introduced Senate Bill 1613, initiating the Umatilla
Basin Project. Now that there was a bill before Congress, the Pacific Northwest
Utilities Conference Committee became Bonneville's champion to keep BPA from
becoming involved. PNUCC is a consortium of Bonneville's biggest customers: the
direct service industries, which includes aluminum factories, private utilities, and
public utilities. It argued strenuously against Bonneville's supplying money for the
interim water, especially to provide the power for the pumps. PNUCC saw that the
cost of the electricity would be passed on to ratepayers through its constituents.
These industries feared they would ultimately pay for the pumping through increases
in their power bills. PNUCC maintained, just as BPA argued against the Umatilla
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Fish Restoration Program, that ratepayers should not be responsible for fish
mitigation in areas unaffected by hydroelectric dams.i"
PNUCC's position in regard to the Project might seem reasonable, until one
considers its earlier reaction to the Umatilla Fish Restoration Program. In 1985,
PNUCC hired a biological consultant, Don Chapman, to examine the Comprehensive
Plan for Rehabilitation of Anadromous Fish Stocks in the Umatilla River Basin,
written byODFW. The Comprehensive Plan was the report that ODFW and the
Tribes produced in response to BPA's request to see the "hypothetical" fish
produced by each stream improvement." PNUCC cited Chapman's examination of
this ODFW report and stated that the fishery goals ofthe Umatilla program "cannot
possibly be achieved until sufficient water flows are provided, particularly in the
lower sections of the Umatilla.,,4o One year later, PNUCC argued against the water
allocation that would make restoration feasible. A 1986 letter from PNUCC to the
Bureau of Reclamation stated its basic position. First, BPA had no obligation to pay
for fish mitigation of any kind in the Umatilla because the damage was a result of
irrigation, not hydropower. Second, BPA had no business funding the costs of the
pumps. Third, that increased stream flows usually would end up benefiting irrigators,
not fish.4! This last item shows an interestingbreak between river users. To protect
its own interests, PNUCC was willing to attack irrigators, who traditionally made up
part of an alliance ofriver users-irrigators, direct service industries, and barge
operators.
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In PNUCC's opinion, Bonneville's involvement violated the Northwest
Power Act's "in-lieu" provision. The Act prohibited BPA from funding anything "in
lieu of other expenditures authorized or acquired from other entities under other
agreement or provisions oflaw.,,42 According to PNUCC, if the federal government
was going to fund and construct the Umatilla Basin Project, then the pumping was
the responsibility of the agent of the federal government, the Bureau of Reclamation.
Bonneville had no role to play.
Further, as PNUCC pointed out in a 1988 letter to Senator Hatfield, for BPA
to pay for such pumping constituted a subsidy of irrigators by ratepayers. In addition,
PNUCC disagreed with the Council's interpretation of "mitigation." PNUCC found
BPA's role in projects such as screening irrigation ditches from young salmon
inappropriate since it was addressing issues that had nothing to do with hydropower
generation.t' It argued that the Umatilla Basin Project's benefits to the fishery were
"overstated." In March, PNUCC sent a flyer to its constituents, reporting that
Congress was going to obligate Bonneville "to provide free pumping for fish."
Impacts to Umatilla salmon were not caused by the federal hydropower system, and
it urged its members to "contact Senator Hatfield ... and express your opposition to
the BPA provisions of this legislation.':"
What PNUCC really feared was a precedent-setting appropriation of
Bonneville funds to pay for damage done to salmon streams by irrigation. There
were many rivers on the plateau degraded by irrigated farming, like the Imnaha, the
Wallowa, the Grande Ronde, the Walla Walla, the Tucannon, and others. These
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rivers flowed through treaty-ceded lands where the all Treaty Tribes had fishing
rights. If BPA was forced to pay to put water back into one river like the Umatilla,
there seemed no limit as to how many river basins it might be required by the
Council to re-water." PNUCC considered funding the big irrigation pumps a
"Pandora's box" of mitigation projects would come out ofBPA's pocket, even
though Bonneville had nothing to do with the fish disappearing from a particular
river.46
For their part, the Tribes were just as insistent that BPA pay for the pumping,
both for the project itself, and the water that the river would need in the interim
period before the project was completed. In 1986, the chinook smolts tribal
biologists had released in 1982 were to return, and the Umatilla Basin Project would
be under construction but not completed. Ed Chaney anticipated Bonneville's
resistance in a September letter to CTUIR Chairman Ken Hall. Chaney wrote of the
necessity of gaining "leverage in the upcoming battle to get BPA to provide the
pumping power for the project via our proposed amendment to the Columbia Basin
Fish and Wildlife Program.?" Because the Council had stated that mitigation could
proceed far from the source of the damage, Chaney saw BPA's paying for pumping
power totally consistent with mitigation. Regardless, PNUCC's insistence that
Bonneville be excluded from the project proved in vain. The Bureau of Reclamation
went ahead with their project plan and in 1988 Congress passed the Umatilla Basin
Act, which endorsed and appropriated funds for the Bureau's Umatilla Basin Project
as planned. The act explicitly confirmed that Bonneville would "provide for project
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power needed to effect the water exchange with irrigation districts for purposes of
mitigating anadromous fishery resources." The act stated that this was "consistent
with provisions of the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program .... ,,48 This
legislation negated the question of "in-lieu" funding for power.
According to a 1989 draft, the Umatilla Basin Project called for three stages.
Before the Bureau could implement Phase I, it had to address the so-called interim
pumping problem. The salmon the Tribes released into the river back in 1982 were
due back, followed closely by the first returning fish produced by the new Minthom
Springs facility. To provide water for the returning Umatilla fish, the Bureau would
pump Columbia River water into the existing infrastructure of the irrigation districts.
This water would water the last three miles of the Umatilla was to be done with.
This part ofthe project would provide water enough water until the new Phase I was
built.
Phase I, as previously described, would replace water that the WElD took
from the Umatilla at Threemile Dam to the west. It was this appropriation that was
the most immediately grievous to migrating fish, for it left the last three miles totally
dry in the fall. If the Tribes could get returning salmon up to Threemile Dam, the
new collection facility (part of the Restoration Program) would gather the chinook
and either spawn them at the Threemile facility or transport them upstream by truck
where they could be released and continue their migration to spawning grounds on
the reservation. This could hardly be called a "naturally" spawning salmon, but the
years of human-induced drought could not be overcome in a single stroke.
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Phase II, as the Bureau of Reclamation now called this part of the Project,
would provide water to the Stanfield and Hermiston irrigation districts. Those two
districts took most of their water from McKay Reservoir, ten miles south of
Pendleton. But there were also several irrigation diversions on the reach ofthe
Umatilla between Echo and Threemile Dam that naturally spawning fish would
eventually need in order to get to spawning grounds on the reservation and beyond.
Judging by its communication with PNUCC, the Tribes, and the NPPC, the
Bonneville Power Administration did not have any intention of providing the funds
needed to bring salmon back to the Umatilla River. Unlike BPA's response to the
fish restoration program, where it fought by itself to slow or kill funding, it was
BPA's chief constituents, represented by PNUCC, which fought BPA's role in the
Umatilla Basin Project. Bonneville did not object. This, at least, gives some
perspective as to whom Bonneville felt responsible. Clearly, it was not the Northwest
Power Planning Council.
tOOOt
"Pork Wrapped in an Indian Blanket,,49
In 1987, the Bureau of Reclamation proceeded installing pumps in the
McNary Pool and building a delivery system to irrigators on the west side of the
Umatilla. In the interim, existing infrastructure, that is, canals and ditches and pumps
already used by various irrigation districts, would shunt some Columbia River water
to WElD.
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The unlikely alliance between Indians and irrigators marked an important
shift in the struggle to re-allocate western resources according to values other than
extraction. Suddenly, environmental and cultural concerns became integral parts of
the discussion. But although environmental restoration was the ultimate goal of this
project, not all environmentalists appreciated another water project in the arid
plateau. Just as conflicts over details of funding with BPA and PNUCC were
beginning to subside, there came an attack on the project from another quarter. The
Indians had united with irrigated farmers because those traditional extractors had
control of the water and, barring a lengthy court struggle, would always have the last
word. Now they watched as their partners the irrigators came under fire from an
environmental group.
This environmental group, WaterWatch of Oregon, had been worried with
flows and irrigation practices in the Umatilla Basin since the late 1980s. WaterWatch
saw the Umatilla Basin Project as another pork barrel project for irrigators
camouflaged in good will for Native Americans, a project that would take water out
of the Columbia now that the Umatilla was dry.5oThe more WaterWatch looked at
the project and tried to make their concerns known to the state, the more frustrated
they became. So, WaterWatch turned to the tool that the Tribes had rejected years
earlier: litigation. By tangling a project still in the panning stages in the courts
WaterWatch's threatened litigation could convince Congress that the project was too
contentious to fund. This environmental group became a major actor by threatening
the entire process so carefully built by the Tribes since 1980.
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WaterWatch had spent years corresponding with the Oregon Water
Resources Department (OWRD) urging that agency to enforce Oregon water law on
the irrigation districts of the Umatilla River Basin. Specifically, WaterWatch accused
the OWRD of complicity with the "waterspreading" that the irrigation districts had
been engaged in for years. Waterspreading is the sale of an irrigation district's
unused irrigation water to other farmers, or even other irrigation districts. According
to Oregon water law, when an irrigator initiated state mandated water conservation
techniques and this implementation resulted in less water withdrawn, then the
irrigator must leave that saved water in the river. But in practice, many irrigators
from the big four irrigation districts--the Hermiston, Stanfield, Westland, and West
Extension Irrigation Districts--would sell that "excess" water, "spreading" the water
to other farmers outside their boundaries.
The Umatilla Basin Project had been stalled for two years because of "White
House budget cutters," according to the Oregonian. 51 The Reagan administration's
budget for 1988 had no Umatilla money. In Spring of 1991 the House
Appropriations Committee reinstated $4 million dollars in funds to complete Phase I
of the project. By 1991, WaterWatch decided that OWRD had not acted on
WaterWatch's concerns. Informed of that the Bureau of Reclamation was proceeding
with the Umatilla Project, WaterWatch attacked. In September 1991, it wrote to
Senator Hatfield, informing the Umatilla Basin Project's chief sponsor in the senate
that "illegal water marketing activities" endangered the capability of the Umatilla
Basin Project to achieve its goals" WaterWatch also filed a petition to amend the
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Umatilla Basin Project. In order to "encourage restoration" of the Umatilla River,
WaterWatch demanded that OWRD "terminate illegal, unpermitted, and forfeited
diversions and uses.':"
WaterWatch backed up its charges by producing several OWRD and Bureau
of Reclamation memoranda showing that OWRD had long known about illegal
waterspreading. OWRD's internal memos show that it instructed the Westland
Irrigation District to cease his practice in 1986, but did nothing to enforce
I· 54comp lance.
The Bureau of Reclamation did not escape the wrath of Water Watch. In a
letter to John Keys, the regional director of the Bureau, WaterWatch informed the
Bureau that it must
enforce Bureau of Reclamation contracts for McKay Reservoir
water. ...Westland Irrigation District is violating its contract with the
Bureau of Reclamation by marketing McKay Reservoir water to Teel
Irrigation District individuals. Other irrigation districts in the Umatilla
Basin are also marketing water in violation of federal contracts 55
The so-called Teel Irrigation District was one of the smaller entities of two or three
farmers that had limited access to the Umatilla and therefore bought unused water
from one of the established four irrigation districts. Since McKay reservoir was a
part of the original Bureau of Reclamation project, it still had nominal control over
some of that water. If the Bureau failed to deal with illegal Westland Irrigation
District withdrawals, or confront OWRD's lax enforcement, then it would "violate
Congressional intent as expressed through the Umatilla Basin Project authorization
legislation" which was to restore streamflows for anadromous fish 56 Based on this
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history of heedlessness, WaterWatch would oppose the project unless the Bureau and
OWRD would enforce their own rules.
This attack came at a critical time. Congress demanded as part of the
Umatilla Basin Project Act that the Bureau examine the existing operations of water
allocations in the basin" The Bureau of Reclamation and OWRD had just applied
for the necessary permits from the federal and state governments to alter the original
Umatilla Basin Project (constructed between 1906 and 1927) and change OWRD's
method of determining water rights and allocations. IfWaterWatch sued the
government over the Umatilla Basin Project, that could threaten the second
important Phase. The opinion of the Bureau was that Congress would balk at
continuing to fund a water project that was in litigation.
WaterWatch's accusations precipitated a new crisis when, in 1991, the
Portland Oregonian printed a feature article entitled "The Umatilla River Blues."
This story, which ran over 2,500 words, largely backed up WaterWatch's allegations.
The article chronicled the history of over-appropriation from the tum of the century
to the present time. It said that the U.S. government essentially "promised the river
twice: to the irrigators between 1904 and 1924, and to American Indians" in the
Treaty of 1855. "The Umatilla River Blues" also delved into some ofOWRD's poor
history of over-allocating the Umatilla River, showing OWRD's complicity in
waterspreading. For example, in 1984, William Young, the Director ofOWRD,
awarded a water right to a farmer named Don Brown without the benefit of public
comment-a transaction of which the Tribes had at the time complained bitterly.
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Young had dismissed those tribal complaints. Then, when the Bureau of Reclamation
tried to examine WID's records to investigate the possibility that WID had been
waterspreading to Brown before the Brown was granted the water right, the Bureau
found that Westland had destroyed its recorda."
Reaction to the article was vociferous and immediate. On October 29 1991,
John Keys wrote in a "Letter to the Editor" of the Oregonian that the "Umatilla
River Blues" "disappointed" him. "It was frustrating," he wrote, "for those of
us ... who accepted the challenge to solve a problem to have the resulting product
labeled a 'fraud' by Water Watch ofOregon.,,59In November, Keys heard back from
WaterWatch. Tom Simmons, the chairman of the organization, wrote to Keys to
reiterate the demands of WaterWatch: that the Oregon Department of Justice assign a
special prosecutor to "ensure enforcement of state water laws in the Umatilla Basin,"
and that the Bureau also release all documents that it had showing its own
unwillingness to enforce water laws. While mentioning that WaterWatch preferred
negotiating to litigating, Simmons nevertheless stated clearly that it would request a
hearing by Congress on the waterspreading activity and how Congressional intent
was being undermined by the Bureau and OWRD. "If the Phase II permit is thrown
into a contested case hearing, it is not likely the issues will be resolved in time for
Congress to budget Phase II costs next year."?"
That same October, WaterWatch's chief counsel, Bill Kloos, sent the Oregon
Water Resources Commission a letter commenting on specific water permit
applications under consideration by the Commission from. Kloos' comments were
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intended to convince OWRD to monitor actual withdrawals from the Umatilla so that
irrigation districts would not simply continue to appropriate Umatilla River water
while they were withdrawing Columbia River water from the Project. WaterWatch
feared that the irrigation districts would sell this water outside districts. The letter
itemized the way WID and the Hermiston Irrigation District continued to waste and
illegally divert water."
The institutional response was also swift. On November 25,1991, OWRD
issued a "Notice of Public Meeting on Enforcement Schedule for the Umatilla River
and McKay Creek.,,62 The Notice outlined the measures the OWRD intended to take
in order to meet the goals of the Umatilla Basin Project. From September 1991 to
Spring of 1994, this schedule itemized many of the concerns WaterWatch had
mentioned, such as examination of the mid-Umatilla rights claimed by the Teel
Irrigation District, figuring out who actually used McKay Reservoir water, and
looking closely at how ground water use affected Umatilla streamflows. Also,
OWRD promised to institute a monitoring system to ensure water withdrawals did
not exceed a district's approved rights.
Not surprisingly, reaction to OWRD's new proposals goaded by
WaterWatch's threat, varied according to what camp one represented. Irrigation
districts were outraged. At OWRD's December 3 public hearing, Bill Porfily,
manager of the Westland Irrigation District, made the dire prediction OWRD's
actions would "bankrupt people." Irrigators considered it ridiculous that an
environmental group could hold a federal project "hostage." To them, this was a
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typical case of a west-side environmentalists, out of touch with the farming culture
of the interior, sticking its nose into an east-side situation where all the parties
involved agreed."
For its part, WaterWatch saw a huge federal project going to benefit the same
irrigators that had killed the river. The fact that this project was designed to help
salmon and the Tribes was irrelevant. WaterWatch saw its role as halting the trend of
abuse and over appropriation of Oregon's rivers. The Umatilla was a river where
WaterWatch would take a bold stand.
For the Tribes, the potential fallout from WaterWatch's petition and threat to
sue could have been extremely damaging, if not devastating. The Tribes certainly did
not condone the irrigation districts' illegal water practices, but neither did they want
to anger or alienate their partners and jeopardize their larger goals. At the same time,
the Tribes needed to show concern for WaterWatch's petition and its correct
allegations. Their strategy, recommended by Ed Chaney in a memo to the CTUIR
board would be to
keep the pressure on BR and [irrigation] districts to clean up their acts
without. .. playing into the hands of well-intentioned critics of the project
who in their zeal for 'conservation' and for sticking it to BR and the
irrigators for their past sins unwittingly would sacrifice the opportunity to
enhance instream flows and thereby, would pit the tribe against the
'b I . 64nontn a community.
This public admonition at the irrigation districts, the Bureau, and OWRD would be
for show. There was nothing for the Tribes to gain by "railing" (as Chaney put it) at
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the irrigators. Best to act "concerned," and let the state water resources department
enforce compliance.f
There was also frustration and defiance on the Tribes' part. The Tribes could
not wait for water, but the reforms in irrigating practices demanded by WaterWatch,
while important in themselves, could take long for OWRD to implement. As Ed
Chaney put it, "Contrary to what the good folks at Oregon Water Watch [sic] think,
the tribe should not have to wait more decades for fulfillment of its treaty-reserved
rights to fish until the state, BR and irrigators can get around to cleaning up their
water-use act.,,66
On December 5, representatives from the irrigators, the Bureau of
Reclamation, OWRD, ODFW, WaterWatch, and the Tribes met to hammer out some
sort of compromise to the WaterWatch petition. One source of irritation, and an
example of how complicated these issues were, was that the Bureau had in fact been
selling water from some of its improvements "illegally" to some irrigation districts
without contracts. This was exactly the sort of thing what WaterWatch had
complained of. But the Bureau defended itself, claiming it allowed this because of a
prior agreement with the Westland Irrigation District. In 1984, it had agreed with
WID to change the irrigation district boundaries. This legitimized the sale of Bureau-
contracted water to the so-called Teel Irrigation District, since the new boundaries
for WID would encompass the Teel Irrigation District. The Teel District would not
be "outside" the boundaries any longer.
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In further meetings, these local, state, federal, tribal, and private groups
negotiated desperately to keep the Project from derailing. Exacerbating the situation,
the Water Resources Commission, a division ofOWRD, voted to disallow water to
be withdrawn by the Teel Irrigation District.67 Negotiations continued until February
1992, when the parties signed an agreement allowing the Umatilla Basin Project to
go forward. WaterWatch, mollified by the prompt actions of the Bureau and OWRD,
promised to make sure that it would not turn its petition into a suit that might cause
Congress to withhold the promised funds.
WATER IS AND WILL ALWAYS BE THE MOST CONTENTIOUS RESOURCE in
the American West. Its allocation and the competition of vying interests is harsh. In
the Umatilla Basin, federal dollars and the reform of water allocation practices
soothed these contentions. The new alliances were fragile, as the conflict over
WaterWatch's petition shows. But in the end, these interests, who could hardly have
less in common, agreed to back this project.
This is not to say that this alliance between Indians and irrigators was without
tension or conflict. In the summer of 1992, the drought that hit the entire Pacific
Northwest withered the plateau. In 1991, with the help of BPA, the Tribes had
contracted with the Stanfield Irrigation District to release 3,000 acre-feet of its
contracted water from McKay Reservoir in the spring for two purposes. First it
flushed 2,000,000 smolts into the Columbia, and second it provided enough water for
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returning fish to find the Umatilla and ascend it to the spawning grounds. But
panicked by the extent of the drought and in spite of the fact that it had no shortage
of water, Stanfield reneged on its agreement with the Tribes.68 The Tribes finally got
water from McKay, but it came from WID, and it came too late to save many ofthe
fish struggling to return to the river. Thousands of smolts were wiped out despite
efforts by tribal biologists to truck the small salmon down to the Columbia. After
that horrendous summer, the Bureau of Reclamation started Phase II of the Project in
the fall, but this illustrates how imperfect and contingent this alliance could be.
Irrigation districts were in support of the Tribes as long as they did not have
to give anything up themselves. Outside of curtailing their water-spreading activities,
the irrigation districts have given up nothing throughout the entire process of
Umatilla restoration. And yet the Tribes knew this going in. There is no documentary
evidence that at any time the Tribes planned on moving the region or the local area
toward a goal of equitable and ecologically benign water allocation.
The entities responsible for over-appropriating the river have, in the end,
given up nothing. It was, again, the federal government, which generated the huge
capital for a project that essentially purchasing the region's way out of crisis. The
water that irrigators use still has to come from somewhere. As the conflict over water
during the Drought of 1992 highlights, the fact that although the Umatilla Basin
Project did give new meaning to fish programs, it still shows that when the chips are
down, old ways still prevail. The issues are not settled, merely set aside through
federal largess.
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CHAPTERV-CONCLUSION: A RIVER WON
[M]y tribe cannot, and we have not, ever conceded or thought for a minute
that salmon will not be in the Umatilla in one hundred years. We have
developed our own restoration plan. While we do not say ours is the
perfect plan, we do have some good concepts and a good philosophy. We
have based it on science, but science is not going to solve all of our
problems. We need the will to implement true salmon recovery.
-Don Sampson.I
ONE OFTHE MAJORTHEMESIN ENVIRONMENTALACTIONin the
American West today is restoration. In the Umatilla River Basin, a combination of
culture, law and policy, along with shifting alliances within resource extraction,
produced an environmental success story: salmon have returned to the Umatilla
River, where they spawn naturally after decades of absence. The restoration of
anadromous fish still faces serious problems all over the region, both in the
Columbia River Basin and coastal watersheds. But back in the 1980s, a story
developed in Eastern Oregon where many new patterns originated, patterns that may
help us conceive of new ways of salmon management today.
The Necessity of the Tribes
What the Umatilla story shows us above all else is that salmon restoration in
the Columbia River Basin is simply not possible without a positive role for the
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Indian Tribes of the Mid-Columbia River, a role that they themselves define. There
are two reasons for this. First, individual programs like the Umatilla are
inconceivable without the Tribes and their powerful treaty rights. The treaties
guarantee the Tribes a place in salmon management, and they use this role to focus
on areas that other fish managers may ignore or overlook. Rather than choosing a
stream because of its particular commercial or biological reasons, tribal managers
establish a different set of criteria for choosing streams for rehabilitation based on
the Tribes' cultural imperatives.
Second, the great cultural and historical significance of salmon to Columbia
River Indians impels them to act. This history has forged in native people the will to
keep more than a vestige of their culture alive and vital. In the highly charged
political landscape of salmon restoration, where public will takes long to translate
into political will and action, the signatory tribes of the Treaties of 1855 are a
positive force that continue to redirect energy and attention to what is really
important: the preservation and integrity of this crucial element of Northwest
ecosystems.
It has not always been this way. For many years, those treaty rights lay
moribund, ignored, flouted by the fish and wildlife agencies of the Columbia Basin.
But since the 1960s, the Tribes have made themselves major players by relying on
legal interpretations of the treaties legal from the Winans decision to Judge Orrick's
ruling in Phase II of United States v. Washington, and the statutory obligations to the
Northwest Power Act. This is not to say that the Tribes dictate policy, or even have
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all of their programs implemented. Many of the Tribes' wishes and demands are
either still ignored or fought against by various factions. Some environmental groups
oppose the supplementation programs on the grounds of the possible harm they do to
wild fish. Many Direct Service Industries question the Tribes' motives, claiming that
they are just another river interest using the treaties as a screen to catch endangered
fish. Fishery managers, struggling for funds, find themselves in competition with the
Tribes for hatchery money and for control of the fishery. The Bonneville Power
Administration, in an attempt to maintain control over a system it has co-managed
for 50 years, has fought to keep the expensive Fish and Wildlife Program under its
sway. And the Tribes still have no seat on the Northwest Power Planning Council.
The value of the Tribes to salmon restoration goes beyond the rehabilitation
of rivers that flow through their reservations, like the Umatilla and the Yakima.
Tribal influence extends to the ceded lands and rivers, also. Armed with fishing
rights reserved in the Treaty of 1855, the Umatillas have spearheaded restoration
efforts on other ancestral streams, like the Walla Walla and the Grande Ronde. Only
the Tribes, with the treaties and the Winters Doctrine could have gotten an increase
of water to the Umatilla Basin through the Umatilla Basin Project. Only the Tribes
could have forced the irrigation districts to get on board to support the Umatilla
Basin Project. And only the Tribes had the passion and vision to look at a sink of
agricultural waste and see the Umatilla as something vivacious and alive.
A quick review of other agencies and interest groups show that without the
Tribes, the Umatilla River would probably remain a dead river. No environmental
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group could have restored salmon on the Umatilla. Given the fact that few
environmental organizations have capital sufficient for such an undertaking, it is
highly unlikely that any would take on such a project. The river has no special status,
and it would not qualify for any grants from the government. Also, the Endangered
Species Act played no role: Umatilla chinook and coho were not endangered, they
were extinct. The only way this sort of project could be employed on this river is by
the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation. Only CTUIR's
sovereign interest could have made the Umatilla River a candidate for salmon
restoration.
The Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife had no plans for any fish
projects on the Umatilla before approached by the Tribes for assistance. ODFW
responded quickly with technical assistance and planning. While it was the Tribes'
major partner in this story, it is clear that the wholesale revival of chinook to the
Umatilla was far beyond the scope ofODFW's vision. Similarly, the federal
agencies with jurisdiction over fish, the National Marine Fisheries Service and the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, did not have this sort of restoration in their plans.
These two agencies might have had the legal capacity and the technical skill to put
such reintroduction programs into effect, but such restoration was not on those
agencies agendas.
Finally, it is difficult to see any organization in the state or region
rehabilitating the Umatilla because it looked so bad. During the time of highest use
the dried, desiccated lower river looked as if someone had used it to grow algae
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commercially, then abandoned the project. Where there was water it was a series of
green ponds that moved sluggishly, if at all. There was simply no habitat for
anadromous fish. Only the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation
could have cared enough about such a river to commit such will and effort into
reestablishing it as a cold water habitat for salmonids. Don Sampson says that he
remembers the stories of old-timers who would gaff-hook salmon from the Umatilla
to take home.' To look at such a river with reaches of sun-bleached algae and cattle
manure and see free-swimming fish migrating powerfully upriver, dancing the
mating ritual, digging redds for spawning, and being caught by one's people is to
take heart from such stories.
Far from being an historical afterthought, the Indians of the Columbia Plateau
are an intrinsic part of the river. Ties that defy easy classification connect them to the
Columbia and its tributaries. The powerful cultural values Indians attach to salmon
fuel the will needed to confront state agencies and the federal bureaucracies that run
the river. The Treaties of 1855 and the Northwest Power Act provided the legal tools
for restoration, and the Tribes provided the will. The benefit of strong salmon and
steel head runs to tribal fishers is bound up in a combination of prosperity,
sustenance, and spirit. The Plateau Peoples have been nothing if not stubborn in their
insistence that there be salmon in the rivers, and this stubbornness has today
translated itself into political will.
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Ossified Agencies
Committing will to these kinds of projects means committing money. Passage
of the Northwest Power Act provided the financial opportunity to rehabilitate the
Umatilla. In the early 1980s, the Council committed itself to changing the mindset of
engineering efficiency that had run the river since the Corps built Bonneville Dam. It
backed up the attitude with large amounts of money. Without these funds, only a
major appropriation from Congress could have made the $20 million Umatilla
Program feasible.
The Council's commitment to change showed its adoption of the new
terminology of river biology. Itwould support projects it considered biologically
sound, and it would require such projects be executed in the most cost effective way
possible. The Umatilla Program was among the first large restoration efforts
endorsed by the Council, and to pay for it, the Council turned to the Bonneville
Power Administration, per the Northwest Power Act. When the Council directed
BPA to pay for the Umatilla Program, it was establishing the precedent that the
Council did have such power to direct BPA's release of funds.
This turned out to be much more difficult than imagined. For five years, BPA
resisted funding of the Umatilla program, in spite of the directive of the Northwest
Power Act. The names that consistently appear in the documentation of BPA's
struggle to control the Umatilla Program's funding are the Fish and Wildlife
Division's head, John Palensky, and the Umatilla program manager, Tom Vogel.
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Palensky and Vogel did all they could to control or derail the Umatilla Fisheries
Restoration Program. These two even hinted that BPA was not required to fund any
project that did not meet the Division's criteria; criteria that remained vague the
entire time Vogel remained program manager. When the Tribes, ODFW, and the
Council convinced Bonneville to change personnel and move on the Program, they
forced BPA to accept its role as prime funding agency for the Columbia River Basin
Fish and Wildlife Program.
Salmon management will always be affected by personalities. A recalcitrant
administrator in the wrong place at the wrong time can delay, or perhaps even
destroy, a project. But this event speaks to more. It shows how the agencies runing
the Columbia River system has ossified into a way of seeing the river that is now
obsolete. Bonneville changed structurally and formed a Fish and Wildlife Division,
ostensibly to facilitate the Council's objectives. But conceptually, BPA's ideas on
the river were the same. In fact, it is not clear why Bonneville has such a division.
One must ask, if the Northwest Power Act specifically prevents NPPC from
becoming "a super fish and wildlife agency," why should the Council's funding
agency set up such an agency? What could the staff in such an agency (where many
of the project managers are not even biologists) possibly add to the store of scientific
knowledge amassed by state, federal, tribal, and Council biologists over the past 30
years? The Umatilla story suggests a reason: to retain as much control over the Fish
and Wildlife Program as possible.
140
The Northwest Power Act was not specifically established to ensure fishing
rights, and yet the Northwest Power Planning Council's support for the Umatilla
Program did just that. In the Council's 1984 version of the Columbia River Basin
Fish and Wildlife Program from 1984, Section 106 states that the Council's actions
must be "consistent with the legal rights ofIndian tribes."] The Council clearly saw
that funding a program that would enhance tribal (as well as non-tribal) fishing was
consistent with the Tribes' treaty rights. Within the last ten years some tribal
managers and environmentalists have complained that the Council has become
politicized, a turn that means anadromous fish in the region may not get the kind of
help they need from the entity most able to orchestrate recovery. But in the early
1980s its commitment was strong."
Alliances Old and New
The last of the major lessons of the this story is the realignment of traditional
antagonists into the new alliances that promoted, built, and operated the new fish
facilities and the immense water project that sustains them.
First is the change between the Tribes and Oregon Department of Fish and
Wildlife. Traditionally, Indian tribes and state agencies have clashed over natural
resource issues like hunting and fishing. The past behavior of Oregon's and
Washington's fish and game agencies did not bode well for this sort of alliance5 The
Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife assisted the tribal program with much
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needed technical expertise and provided some of the most important studies of the
Umatilla Basin6
The other transition of allegiances was the shift of the irrigators in the
Umatilla Basin to support the Tribes in calling for the Umatilla Basin Project of
1989. In fact, the re-watering of the Umatilla River may be the most remarkable
aspect of the whole story. This is not because of the money, although the Umatilla
Basin Project cost over $46 million, more than twice what the Umatilla Fish
Restoration Program cost Bonneville. Nor is the scale the most impressive part of the
story, although the transfer of so much water from the Columbia to irrigators over so
many square miles is also remarkable. What makes this so interesting is the break of
the irrigators from their alliance with other river users and their entering a new
alliance with the Indians. Traditionally, farmers, barge operators, and the utilities
have spoken with one voice on issues of river use. But in this case, farmers split with
the utilities over the issue ofBPA's involvement in the Project and joined the Tribes.
The Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference Committee, BPA's chief constituent,
fought to detach BPA from any obligations to what it saw as an irrigation project, not
a fish restoration project. The Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference Committee,
BPA's chief constituent, fought to detach BPA from any obligations to what it saw
as an irrigation project, not a fish restoration project. PNUCC also opposed the
fisheries program, as evidenced by its contracting a biological report on the Umatilla
Basin. In a letter from the biologist commissioned to study the Program for PNUCC,
the biologist wrote that the
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[e]conomic costs ... should be compared to benefits .... [I] cannot walk in the
economists boots, but I can say that I think that even my lowered expectation
of returns from hatchery releases will prove too high. 7
Thus, according to PNUCC's hired expert, the Umatilla Program should be subjected
to a cost-benefit analysis. PNUCC was obviously unhappy with the defection of
irrigators to the Indians, but the irrigators understood that although the Tribes did not
wish to press litigation under the Treaties nor the Winters Doctrine, they still
possessed the legal high ground. The fanners who depended on the Umatilla River
could not afford the crippling loss of their water rights.
Political realignment also included environmentalists. It is unusual that an
environmental group opposes a project whose stated goal is to restore nature. Yet
that is exactly what the Tribes faced when WaterWatch of Oregon attacked the
project as a giveaway to irrigation interests, what they saw as pork-barrel projects for
irrigators wrapped in "an Indian blanket." WaterWatch had a point: irrigators gave
away nothing in this transaction. They retained their water rights and water. In many
ways, irrigators were the prime beneficiaries of the Umatilla Basin Project.
WaterWatch's charges could not be refuted: the documentary evidence shows
Oregon Water Resources Department knew its own regulations were being flouted.
Forcing OWRD and the Bureau of Reclamation to crack down on water law
provided WaterWatch with a limited victory: the Umatilla Basin Project would
benefit the new salmon. But it certainly did not force the region to directly confront
the issues that had killed off anadromous fish in many Plateau rivers.
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The Umatilla still does not flow year-round to the Columbia. As Dave
Duncan, the Bureau of Reclamation's planning manager for the Umatilla Basin
Project, has said: "To keep the Umatilla flowing all year long would take an
incredible amount ofwater."s Nonetheless, there is enough water flowing between
Threemile Dam and the mouth at crucial times to facilitate the migration of Umatilla
River chinook and coho. Many fish are captured and spawned artificially, but these
offspring are reared part-time in natural ponds that allow them to imprint on a real
river. Salmon and steelhead still cannot swim all the way to their spawning grounds,
but they do spawn naturally after tribal fish technicians trap and release them
upstream. This combination of nature and artifice epitomizes the complexity of
restoring a key piece of the environment in the Umatilla Ri ver Basin. It also
highlights still-existing problems acknowledged but not yet approached.
Despite the success of reintroducing water for Umatilla salmon, the Umatilla
Basin Project has limited value as an example a basin-wide solution to irrigation-
based habitat destruction. The struggle between seeing water as a utility for crops
versus water as the life-blood of a living river, the issue initially destroyed the
Umatilla runs, was not solved, but merely sloughed off to another part of the
Columbia River system. This is merely a shift of appropriation, not a solution. While
it did partially solve the Umatilla dilemma, it is not a practical regional solution to
repairing the contributions of irrigation to the salmon crisis." For example, irrigation
also did grave damage to salmon runs in Yakima River. The over-appropriation of
water in this sub-basin so much larger than the Umatilla, and so much farther
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geographically from the Columbia, suggests that there could never be a "Yakima
Basin Project." Assuming that irrigation-ravaged sub-basins like the Yakima or the
Grande Ronde were closer to a source of water like the Columbia, what of over-
appropriating the Columbia itself? Even if the money existed to re-water every single
sub-basin in the Plateau affected by irrigation, even if topography allowed the
construction of a dozen Umatilla-type projects, the Columbia is simply not capable
of providing that much water.
Obviously, each local area must seek a unique, local solution. But what must
be universal is a regional agreement on over appropriating water. Salmon require a
more radical solution than just getting money from the federal government and the
mentality we can have it all, that there is enough water to have abundant salmon runs
and unlimited land under irrigation. It was this mentality that brought this society the
salmon crisis to begin with.
This cornucopian attitude was at play in the Umatilla. Symbolizing this
mentality is the graphic on the header of the official stationary of the Umatilla Basin
Project Steering Committee. Printed on the top all of its of their official memoranda
is a chinook salmon in the upper left corner and a center-pivot irrigation swing in the
right. While in one way this represents the new alliance of fish and irrigation
interests, a co-existence of antagonistic views on the Columbia, it nonetheless shows
an attitude of complacence: the participants dodged the fundamental issue of living
within one's means. Without the extensive resources of the federal government and
the most powerful river in the world at their doorstep, this illusion of abundance
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would be farcical. These two vast resources allowed the Umatilla Basin to keep the
status quo of water resource extraction. This fact restrains the usefulness of the
Umatilla Fish Restoration Program as a "model" restoration plan that could be
duplicated throughout the Columbia River Basin.
The Confederated Tribes did not challenge the way water is allocated in the
Columbia Basin. They too had much to lose in a direct challenge, but fish advocates
and environmentalists might ask what if the Tribes had challenged and won? What
would have happened to water on the Columbia Plateau? The possibility that the
Sahaptin-speaking tribes of the Columbia Plateau could control and allocate water
based on the needs of ecosystems rather than cash crops is nothing less than
revolutionary .
Despite the issues unsolved, this story shows that with the will, Pacific
Northwesterners can check and reverse the declines of anadromous fish in the
Columbia Basin. With native peoples leading the way, forging unlikely, fragile
alliances, restoration is possible. Given a reliable source of money and water, with
concern for biology as an equal to economics, and no interference from agencies at
odds with the goals of the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, salmon
restoration in the sub-basins of the Columbia River Basin is not only possible, but
within the grasp of a single generation.
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A RIVER MAY NOT SEEM "RATIONAL" TO AN ENGINEER, but science has
shown that rivers move along their own lines, following a rationale all their own.
These lines are more complex than we can possibly imagine, and so appear chaotic
or irrational. But more than a hundred years ago, Americans began to remake the
rivers in the West into images that conformed to their sense of "rational": that the
rivers should do work for them-irrigate farms, transport freight, generate power.
From 1905 to 1926, farmers and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation used technology to
rationalize a river that did not belong to them, but rather to an Indian tribe. Irrigators
subdued the Umatilla River to make the plateau burst forth in a profusion of crops.
But in doing so, they obliterated the river's life force, the salmon. Years later, the
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation and the Bureau of
Reclamation used technology to re-naturalize part of that river, to resurrect it from a
vale of farmers' waste and chemical sludge to a salmon stream.
The fate of Pacific salmon in the Columbia River Basin is far from clear.
Today Pacific Northwesterners are faced with crucial and divisive issues that will
determine whether or not these remarkable animals continue to swim into the interior
to spawn. There is a baffling amount of information, generated by biologists and
economists hired by both industries that wish no changes in the status quo ofriver
operations, and by environmental organizations committed to radical alterations on
the river in the name of biology. Somewhere in between are disinterested scientists
who do not always agree on the correct course for society to take.
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What is encouraging in the Umatilla is that many disparate groups were able
to forge an agreement that would bring salmon back to a dead river. Many of these
groups were traditional adversaries, like the Confederated Tribes and the State of
Oregon. Also, when other river-users became involved to stop the agreement, the
Tribes and their allies were able to keep the discussion focused on the river and the
salmon, rather than the money BPA was spending.
There is conflict in the Pacific Northwest over different visions and
expectations of what the Columbia River system is supposed to be. Is the system a
hydroelectric generator, irrigator, transportation artery, an engine of commerce? Or
is it the dynamic core of a larger biotic community, part a living system that includes
both people and animals? This story reveals changes in the relationships of political
and social power in the struggle to control the destiny of the Columbia River system,
and how one group used this new power to advance its own vision of the mid-
Columbia country.
On several levels, the success in the Umatilla Basin is indicative of what
could be accomplished throughout the Columbia River Basin. Given enough money,
water, and will, many distressed river systems in the Columbia Basin can be
rehabilitated, made healthy again with free-spawning salmon.
What this work has tried to do is tell a story of a river restored by people who
remembered the old life of the river. Barry Lopez writes that the most effective
stories we tell are not the ones that purport to "teach." Such stories are merely
pedantic. What we actually derive from stories is subtler:
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Stories do not give instruction, they do not explain how to love a companion
or how to find God. They offer, instead, patterns of sound and association, of
event and image. Suspended as listeners and readers in these patterns, we
might reimagine our lives. It is through story that we embrace the great
breadth of memory, that we can distinguish what is true, and that we may
glimpse, at least occasionally, how to live without despair in the midst of the
horror that dogs us and unhinges us.IO
The memory of the Umatilla, Walla Walla, and Cayuse people is long. They did not
despair. They listened to their stories, both mythological and recent; ancient stories
about Coyote's adventures in the land, and the fishing stories of their grandfathers.
Out of these stories they reimagined their river resurrected, and in doing so they
refused to accept that their traditions and culture could be shattered beyond recall.
By examining the patterns that arise from this new type of restoration and these new
types of alliances, this story has tried to show that Pacific Northwesterners have but
to reimagine the Columbia River and its tributaries, and decide what sort of a river
we want. Then to pursue that image with a will.
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